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General Introduction
Heterogeneity plays an important role in modern economic modeling. First
of all, it is worth to mention the models of overlapping generations (OLG),
where age distribution of the population is not homogeneous. For example,
age distribution of a country population can influence the pension system and
may lead to adoption of an optimal age-selective migration policy by the state,
see e.g. (Simon, Belyakov, & Feichtinger, 2012) or (Belyakov, Feichtinger,
& Simon, 2011). Besides age distribution, heterogeneity can be present in
preferences, technologies, or/and wealth of economic agents. Heterogeneity
of space, age, or size distribution of a renewable product is considered in the
models of optimal fishery or forestry, see e.g. (Belyakov, Davydov, & Veliov,
2013; Belyakov & Veliov, 2014) and references therein.
This thesis consists of three essays studding the influence of heterogene-
ity upon the economic dynamics. In the first model of R&D-based economic
growth the agents have heterogeneous preferences over a growing continuum
of consumption goods. In the second model a monopolist firm or an industry
distributes investments in physical capital among a growing set of technologies
the payoff of which is heterogeneous. In the third model of solving territorial
disputes between countries the income from the land use of a country is not
equally (heterogeneously) distributed among the citizens. Each model is pre-
sented in a separate chapter.
Chapter 1 develops a general equilibrium endogenous growth model in-
volving heterogeneous consumption by an age-structured population with un-
certain but limited life span and balanced life-time budget without bequests.
The heterogeneity is introduced via weights which the individuals attribute in
their utility function to consumption of different goods depending on the vin-
tage of the good. The goods are produced by monopolistically competitive
firms and the variety of available goods/technologies is determined endoge-
nously through R&D investments. The general equilibrium is characterized
by a system of functional equations and is analytically or numerically deter-
mined for several particular weight functions. It is shown that the investments
1
2by agents may be insufficient to sustain growth. Therefore additional invest-
ments are provided by a competitive financial sector. The resulting imbal-
ance between agents’ assets and total value of firms can grow unboundedly
in the case of homogeneous consumption. The results exhibit the qualitative
difference between the dynamics of the model with heterogeneous versus ho-
mogeneous consumption. In particular heterogeneous consumption (when old
goods are discounted) reduces the additional investments by the financial sec-
tor so that the values of firms become balanced by the assets of agents in the
long run. These results are obtained in collaboration with Josef Haunschmied
and Vladimir Veliov, (Belyakov, Haunschmied, & Veliov, 2012).
Chapter 2 deals with optimal control of heterogeneous systems, that is,
families of controlled ODEs parameterized by a parameter running over a do-
main called domain of heterogeneity. The main novelty here is that the domain
of heterogeneity is endogenous: it may depend on the control and on the state
of the system. This extension is crucial for several economic applications and
turns out to rise interesting mathematical problems. A necessary optimality
condition is derived, where one of the adjoint variables satisfies a differential
inclusion (instead of equation) and the maximization of the Hamiltonian takes
the form of “min-max”. As a consequence, a Pontryagin-type maximum prin-
ciple is obtained under certain regularity conditions for the optimal control. A
formula for the derivative of the objective function with respect to the control
from L¥ is presented together with a sufficient condition for its existence. A
stylized economic example is investigated analytically and numerically. These
results are obtained in collaboration with Tsvetomir Tsachev and Vladimir Ve-
liov, (Belyakov, Tsachev, & Veliov, 2011).
Chapter 3 studies a mechanism governing the territory exchange between
groups of people such as countries or municipalities is proposed based on land
trading with approval of both sides under particular voting rule (majority rule,
veto rule, etc.). Voting rules can model different forms of government such
as monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy. Under these forms of government
the influence of hererogeneity of wealth distribution among citizens on the
territory exchange result is studied. Conquest of the territory is considered
as a special case of trading, when the buyer country pays not to the seller
country but to the army which conquer territory for the buyer. Conditions at
which countries prefer to trade land rather than fight for it are found using a
game theoretic approach. This is an extension of the author’s master thesis
(Belyakov, 2007a, 2007b), the results of witch were presented in (Belyakov,
2009).
Chapter 1
Heterogeneous consumption in
OLG model with horizontal
innovations
1.1 Introduction
In this chapter we present and investigate a general equilibrium model com-
prised of the following components: firms producing consumption goods, R&D
firms developing new goods, bank sector, and age-structured consumers. A
main new feature of the model is, that the consumption is heterogeneous and
the consumers’ preference may depend on the vintage of a particular good,
as well as on the current technological frontier. This, together with the in-
volvement of the bank sector, allows to reveal interesting new results about the
economic growth.
In the proposed model, agents consume a continuum of perishable goods
produced by monopolistically competitive firms. Each firm possesses a per-
manent patent which the firm buys on perfectly competitive R&D market. The
needed investments are provided by a competitive bank sector, and are secured
by agents’ savings and future firms profits. We consider any improvement in
the quality of a good as the invention of a new good by some R&D firm that
increases the variety of goods, thus implying only horizontal innovations. The
variety of goods increases with a speed proportional to the labor employed by
perfectly competitive R&D firms with allowance for knowledge spillover, like
in Romer (1990).
The consumers, that is, the population in the considered closed economy,
have a finite (but uncertain) life span and no bequest intention. This com-
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ponent of the model adapts the Cass and Yaari (1967) framework and differs
from the perpetual youth models (e.g., Blanchard, 1985), and from more gen-
eral (possibly realistic) demographic setup in (Faruqee, 2003), since finite life
span facilitates rigorous mathematical proofs. A general equilibrium model
with realistic survival probability is considered in (Boucekkine, de la Croix, &
Licandro, 2002).
We consider differentiated goods as final consumption goods, like in Judd
(1985), and disentangle the concepts of productivity growth and growth of the
variety of goods. In other words, scientists increase the variety of products
rather than the productivity of labor. Indeed, the invention of a new car de-
sign does not mean that the sells of cars would increase in total or that new
car is produced with less labor. The result of the invention can be that people
would just buy cars of new design instead of old one. Although old fashioned
cars may still be attractive to some customers and expensive, the production
of such cars would decrease. Hence, the total production may stay the same,
while the utility of a consumer increases because of the increasing variety of
designs, since the consumer can find the most suitable car for her among newly
invented designs. We do not specify how productivity of labor (and therefore
per capita consumption) depends on R&D activity. This contrasts idea-based
growth models (e.g., Romer, 1990) where the invention of a new good (tech-
nology) immediately increases productivity of labor and hence per capita con-
sumption. That results in the scale effect prediction when the long run growth
rate depends on the population of the country (scale of the economy), which
is strongly at odds with 20th-century empirical evidence, see (Jones, 1995a,
1995b). We can still have a scale effect for the growth rate of agents’ util-
ities, because the instantaneous utility depends on the increasing variety of
goods. But, per capita consumption may not depend on the variety of goods
in our model. Thus, we avoid determining the real growth rate of per capita
consumption, included in GDP per capita, and its scale effect predictions.
We study the growth of lifetime discounted utility of generations. All
agents are born with zero assets and should be insured from dying indebted.
Agents can borrow money from other coexisting generations like in d’Albis
and Augeraud-Ve´ron (2011) which is a continuous time generalization of dis-
crete pure exchange OLG models (e.g., Samuelson, 1958; Gale, 1973). In our
model we introduce production without physical capital as in Sorger (2011),
so that agents can invest only in patents. But, in contrast to Sorger (2011),
the agents are not the only investors in the model. The reason for that is
the absence of infinitely living agents’ cohorts (Blanchard, 1985) or house-
holds (Romer, 1990; Sorger, 2011) to own infinitely living firms. The wish of
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agents to consume all their bounded lifetime income would hamper their in-
vestments in firms and stop the growth. Aggregated assets of agents are proved
to be bounded and could be even negative like in pure exchange OLG models
(Samuelson, 1958; Gale, 1973) depending on the income pattern over the life
of an agent. So in the case of endogenous growth there could be imbalance
between aggregated assets and the total value of all patents in the economy. To
resolve this issue we introduce competitive banking sector which plays a role
of infinitely living institution investing in new firms. Banks give loans to the
startup firms for purchasing the patents under the pledge of these very patents.
Because of the difference between savings and patents’ value the economy
needs money (liquidity) provided by the banks. Thus, the banks create addi-
tional liquidity equal to the change of the value of the patents in the economy.
Hence, there are two asset markets in the economy. The one is the market of
firms’ loans balanced with the values of their patents. The other is the mar-
ket of agents’ savings balanced with their life insurances, according to which
in the case of sudden death of an agent her debt is repayed or her deposit is
taken by the insurance company. The banks keep deposits of agents under the
same interest rate as loans for the firms because of the no-arbitrage condition.
But we do not require the balance between agents’ savings and firms’ loans.
Moreover, it will be seen that such requirement is not needed in our model for
determining a general equilibrium and could make the growth impossible.
A substantial novelty of the proposed model is that it is a hybrid of con-
tinuous time OLG model and growth model with a continuum of consumption
goods. It happens that optimal consumption of an agent can be obtained by
a two-stage procedure similar to the one in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). The
main result is that for the agents’ savings alone may be not enough for growth.
Additional money is needed, which is provided by banks. One can interpret
this money as a negative bubble. It is proven that aggregated assets of agents
are bounded while the total value of intellectual property in the economy with
homogeneous consumption can grow unboundedly so the difference between
agents’ savings and the value of patents can also be unlimited. The hetero-
geneity of consumption (discounting old goods) brings qualitative difference
in the model dynamics compared to the homogenous case. The heterogeneity
can make the total value of patents be bounded with zero limit, thus reducing
the imbalance between savings of agents and the value of patents. The growth
of the lifetime discounted utility of agents’ generations could be bounded in
the heterogeneous case in contrast to the case of homogeneous consumption,
where the growth of utility is unbounded. It means that in the long run agents
preferring new goods do not appreciate further increase of the variety of goods.
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In the case of homogeneous consumption we prove that the real interest rate
tends to zero which is the biological interest rate (the population growth rate
which is zero in the long run), see Samuelson (1958). While the general equi-
librium with heterogeneous consumption can be inefficient and the real interest
rate can become negative as it may happen in OLG models (e.g., Blanchard,
1985; Diamond, 1965). We observed that in both heterogeneous and homoge-
neous cases the variety of goods can grow unboundedly.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.1.1 introduces population
and labor dynamics. Section 1.1.2 solves the agent’s problem of finding her op-
timal consumption and investment profiles. Section 1.1.3 considers the monop-
olistically competitive production of continuum of goods and finds the price of
goods in equilibrium. Section 1.1.4 introduces competitive R&D sector that
increases the variety of goods. Section 1.1.5 finds the equilibrium conditions
in financial sector (zero profit of banks) and in R&D sector (zero profit of
R&D firms). Section 1.1.6 describes the market clearing including the full em-
ployment condition. Section 1.1.7 presents final succinct format of the general
equilibrium equations. Section 1.2 studies dynamics of aggregated variables
and life time aggregated utility of an agent. Section 1.3 discusses the model
considering another source of heterogeneity in section 1.3.2 with introduction
of heterogeneous production of labor that also allows for discussion on the
economic growth in section 1.3.3. Section 1.3.1 introduces the government
and shows that its fiscal policy is efficient in the heterogeneous case in con-
trast to the homogeneous one. Section 1.4 concludes the chapter. The proofs
are located in the Appendix as well as the numerical procedure is described in
Appendix 1.8.
1.1.1 Population and labor
The population is time-varying and exogenous: n(t; t) denotes the size at time
t of the population cohort born at time t . It is assumed that there is a maximal
age w , so that n(t;t) = 0 for t t  w , but n(t ; t)> 0 for 0 t t < w . That
is, there are always some people in every cohort until it reaches age w .
For the population function n(; ) it is assumed that it is continuous in t
for any fixed t and is non-increasing and absolutely continuous in t for every
fixed t . Then the function
S(t ; t) n(t ; t)
n(t ;t)
is the survival probability at time t of an individual of cohort t . Survival prob-
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ability defines mortality rate as
m(t; t)  S˙(t ; t)
S(t ; t)
=  n˙(t ; t)
n(t ; t)
(1.1)
(the dot above a symbol denotes the derivative with respect to the time t). Thus,
we have the expression
S(t ; t) = e 
R t
t m(t;q)dq (1.2)
for the survival probability, thus
n(t; t) = n(t ;t)e 
R t
t m(t;q)dq : (1.3)
The total population at t is obtained by the integration of n over all currently
living cohorts
N(t)
Z t
t w
n(t; t)dt:
We assume that each individual is endowed with l(t; t) units of homoge-
neous labor per time, so that
L(t)
Z t
t w
l(t; t)n(t; t)dt (1.4)
is the total amount of available labor units in the economy at time t.
1.1.2 Consumption and savings
The evolution of the assets is determined by the consumption/saving decisions
of the individuals. The assets are homogeneous, while the consumption goods
are heterogeneous: products labeled by the numbers q 2 [0;Q(t)] are available
at time t. These products are ordered according to the invention time of the
respective technology q, so that Q(t) is the newest product at time t – the one
just created at t.
It is assumed that each individual has perfect foresight for the wage w(t),
the real return rate on asset r(t), the available consumption goods q2 [0;Q(t)],
and their real prices p(t;q), for all t within her life-horizon. Under particular
normalization of wage and productivity of labor, the prices p will be proven
to be constant over both t and q. To write everything in real terms we will use
labor as numeriare, that is, we set the wage equal to unity, w(t) 1. The wage,
normalized to 1, is assumed to be equal for all jobs, which is reasonable in a
model where qualification is not taken into account.
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A representative agent born at time t chooses her consumption c(t; t;q) of
good q 2 [0;Q(t)] at time t so that her expected total discounted utility
u(t)
Z t+w
t
e r(t t)S(t; t)
Z Q(t)
0
m(t; t;q;Q(t)) c(t ; t;q)a dqdt (1.5)
is maximized subject to the dynamic budget constraint
a˙(t ; t) = l(t ; t)+(r(t)+m(t ; t))a(t; t) 
Z Q(t)
0
p(t;q)c(t; t;q)dq; (1.6)
with the following boundary conditions, due to the absence of bequest,
a(t;t) = 0; (1.7)
a(t;t+w) = 0; (1.8)
where a(t; t) is the real amount of assets that the agent has at time t 2 [t ;t+w],
a 2 (0;1) is an elasticity parameter, m(t; t;q;Q(t)) 0 is the weight function,
with which an agent aggregates her utilities from consumption of different
products. The weight function m(t; t;q;Q(t)) represents agent’s preferences
among available goods q 2 [0;Q(t)] and is assumed to be strictly positive at
least on some subset of [0;Q(t)] with positive measure. That will result in
positive demand for new goods. The weight function m(t; t;q;Q(t)) makes
the goods heterogeneous if it depends on q. Notice that it can depend on the
current technological frontier Q and on the age t   t of the agent. We will
show how the shape of the function m qualitatively determines the outcome of
general equilibrium.
We assume that individuals are insured against the risk of dying with posi-
tive assets by a fair life-insurance company in the spirit of Yaari (1965) that
redistributes wealth of individuals who died to those who are still alive in
the same cohort1. Therefore the real rate of return r(t) is augmented by the
mortality rate m(t ; t). Thus, functional (1.5) is an extension of that in Judd
(1985). The main novelty is the function m(t; t;q;Q(t)) which makes goods
heterogeneous2. Since the insurance should ensure that each cohort ultimately
consumes all its assets we add the end-point condition (1.8). The absence of
bequest implies the initial condition (1.7).
1The equal saving/debt redistribution of deceased agent only within her cohort satisfies the
balance of fare insurance, because agents from the same cohort have the same assets and proba-
bility of death. This redistribution is possible due to the assumption that there are always some
people in the cohort until it becomes w years old (n(t; t)> 0 for 0 t  t < w).
2The functional form m(t; t;q;Q(t)) is given exogenously, thus it differs from the quality in
quality-adjusted Dixit-Stiglits consumption index used in some models with vertical innovations
(e.g., Dinopoulos & Thompson, 1998).
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For any fixed t problem (1.5)–(1.8) has an optimal control c(t; ; ) which
can be obtained by a two-stage procedure similar to the one in Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977).
In the inner stage we define the total real expenditures for consumption at
time t as
E(t ; t)
Z Q(t)
0
p(t;q)c(t ; t;q)dq: (1.9)
Then we fix an arbitrary non-negative function E() and determine for fixed t
and t the optimal distribution c(t; t; ) that maximizes the inner integral in (1.5)
subject to (1.9). The solution is
c(t ; t;q) =

m(t ; t;q;Q(t))
p(t;q)
 1
1 a E(t ; t)
G(t; t)
; (1.10)
where
G(t; t)
Z Q(t)
0

m(t ; t;q;Q(t))
p(t;q)
 1
1 a
p(t;q)dq: (1.11)
The resulting value of the instantaneous utility (the inner integral in (1.5)) can
be written as (G(t; t))1 a(E(t; t))a . Then, inserting expression (1.2) for the
survival probability and solution (1.10) of the inner problem in (1.5), we obtain
the following outer problem (for a fixed cohort t)
u(t) =
Z t+w
t
e r(t t) 
R t
t m(t;q)dq (G(t; t))1 a (E(t; t))a dt ! max
E(t;)
; (1.12)
subject to
a˙(t; t) = l(t; t)+(r(t)+m(t ; t))a(t; t) E(t ; t); E(t; t) 0;(1.13)
a(t;t) = 0; a(t ;t+w) = 0: (1.14)
Using the Pontryagin maximum principle we obtain the following first-order
conditions for problem (1.12)–(1.14):
a

E(t ; t)
G(t ; t)
a 1
 l (t; t) = 0; (1.15)
 l˙ (t ; t) = l (t; t)(r(t) r) ; (1.16)
where l (t; t) is the adjoint variable representing the marginal utility per unit
of income. Note that like in Sorger (2011) the adjoint equation (1.16) does
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not depend on the mortality rate m because the agent has fair life insurance.
Adjoint equation (1.16) has the solution
l (t ; t) = l0(t)e 
R t
t (r(h) r)dh ; (1.17)
which defines along with (1.15) the solution of the outer problem
E(t; t) = G(t; t)

e
R t
t (r(q) r)dq a
l0(t)
 1
1 a
; (1.18)
where l0(t) is the initial value (at time t = t) of the adjoint variable that has to
be adjusted to ensure the end-condition a(t+w) = 0 in (1.14). In doing this it
will be notationally convenient to define the discount factors
Rm(t ; t)  exp

 
Z t
t
(r(q)+m(t;q)) dq

; (1.19)
Rr(t ; t)  exp

 
Z t
t
r  r(q)
1 a dq

: (1.20)
Standard calculations using the Cauchy formula for the solution of (1.13) and
notations (1.19)–(1.20) give the following expression for l0(t), for which con-
ditions (1.14) are satisfied
a
l0(t)
 1
1 a
=
R t+w
t Rm(t ; t) l(t; t)dtR t+w
t Rr(t ; t)Rm(t ; t)G(t; t)dt
: (1.21)
Then expression (1.18) with the use of (1.20) and (2.3) takes the explicit form
E(t; t) = G(t ; t)
Rr(t ; t)
R t+w
t Rm(t;s)l(t ;s)dsR t+w
t Rr(t;s)Rm(t;s)G(t ;s)ds
: (1.22)
Using (1.10) and (1.22), one can obtain the consumption of product q at time t
by an agent born at t :
c(t; t;q) =

m(t ; t;q;Q(t))
p(t;q)
 1
1 a Rr(t ; t)h(t)R t+w
t Rr(t ;s)Rm(t;s)G(t;s)ds
: (1.23)
It is proportional to the agent’s human wealth defined as in Blanchard (1985)
h(t)
Z t+w
t
Rm(t ;s)l(t;s)ds; (1.24)
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which is the present value of agent’s income flow from labor. The propensity
to consume the product q decreases with its relative price
p(t;q)
m(t; t;q;Q(t))
Z t+w
t
Rr(t;s)Rm(t;s)G(t ;s)ds
1 a
and (due to the multiplier Rr(t ; t) in (1.23)) with the age of the agent t   t ,
provided that r > r() in (1.20). There is no nonhuman wealth in the model
because other factors of production (besides labor, e.g. physical capital avail-
able for agents to invest into) are absent. Thus, agents’ assets only redistribute
values among generations in time.
Note that the optimal consumption profile (1.23) is completely defined by
the price p(; ), the real interest rate r(), and the frontier of the product va-
riety Q(). This is the key difference from the models with infinitely living
households (like in Sorger, 2011) or OLG models with bequests, where con-
sumption also depends on some free variable (l0(t) in Sorger, 2011) which is
to be defined in equilibrium.
1.1.3 Production sector
Further we assume that each product q 2 [0;Q(t)] available at time t is pro-
duced by a single firm, that is, we implement the concept of monopolistic
competition. Starting from its creation, the firm producing product qmay exist
forever.3 Moreover, we assume, similarly as Sorger (2011), that the production
of each good involves only labor, and that the production of one unit of any
good requires one unit of labor.
Here we denote byC(t;q) the production of good q and use the fact that at
equilibrium it is equal to the aggregated consumption of good q:
C(t;q)
Z t
t w
c(t; t;q)n(t; t)dt: (1.25)
The firm holding permanently the patent for product q sets the price p =
p(t;q). Inserting (1.23) into (1.25) one can express the demanded quantity
at price p as
C(t;q) =
F(t;q)
p
1
1 a
; (1.26)
3There is no scrap time presented in classical vintage models. Nevertheless the firm may
stop production of its product, when demand for it becomes zero, because of the function m.
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where the function
F(t;q) =
Z t
t w
(m(t ; t;q;Q(t)))
1
1 a Rr(t; t)h(t)R t+w
t Rr(t;s)Rm(t ;s)G(t ;s)ds
n(t ; t)dt
does not depend on the price p(t;q) of any particular good q due to the assump-
tion of monopolistic competition. It follows from the definition of G(t ; t) in
(1.11) that it depends on the prices of the goods in an integrated form, so that
no single firm may influence F(t;q). The q-th firm produces quantity C(t;q),
the production cost of which in real terms is C(t;q), according to the assump-
tion that the production of one unit of any good requires one unit of labor.
Then the real operating profit of the q-th firm at time t is
p(t;q) = pC(t;q) C(t;q): (1.27)
Due to (1.26) the firm’s profit takes the form
p(t;q) = (p 1) p  11 a F(t;q);
which attains its maximum with respect to the price p at
p(t;q) =
1
a
: (1.28)
Thus, all goods have the same price (1.28), although the consumption of these
goods (1.23), (1.25) can be different due to different preferences. The reason
for such simple (constant) prices is the normalization of wage and productivity
of labor to unity, i.e. that any product q is measured in labor units spent for
its production. For the optimal operating profit of the q-th firm at time t (with
q 2 [0;Q(t)]) we obtain from (1.27) and (1.28) the expression
p(t;q) =
1 a
a
C(t;q); (1.29)
relating this profit with the productionC(t;q), which is equal to the aggregated
consumption according to (1.25).
1.1.4 R&D sector
The R&D sector produces new technologies increasing in this way the vari-
ety [0;Q(t)] of available consumer’s goods. The R&D industry sells patents
of infinite life for new productions. The R&D sector is a perfectly competi-
tive industry which requires only labor and shares the labor market with the
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production sector, so that the wage at time t is w(t) = 1. Similarly as Jones
(1995b); Kortum (1997); Segerstrom (1998) we assume that the dynamics of
the technological frontier Q(t) is given by the equation
Q˙(t) = b (Q(t))j LQ(t); (1.30)
where LQ(t) is the total labor employed in R&D, b > 0 is a productivity pa-
rameter, j is the parameter determining how productivity depends on Q(t),
that is on the already existing technologies. Thus, we allow for knowledge
spillover if j > 0 4. With j > 0, formulation (1.30) implies increasing returns
to scale in R&D, when previous inventions raise the productivity of current re-
search effort. Alternately, with j < 0, the formulation allows for diminishing
returns in R&D, as if past inventions make it more difficult to find new ideas.
For models with different values of the parameter j see Jones (1999) and the
references therein. For example, with j = 1, in Romer (1990); G. M. Gross-
man and Helpman (1991a); Aghion and Howitt (1992) models, each unit of
research effort can produce a proportionate increase in the technological vari-
ety.
Entrepreneurs buying new patents have perfect foresight. An entrepreneur
knows future demand for the product and (1.26) thus, her future operational
profit (1.29). If weight functionm is strictly positive in the vicinity of q=Q(t),
then at least during some nonzero time interval, the operational profit flow from
production of new goods is nonzero. Hence, entrepreneurs have incentives to
buy new patents and found firms, because people will consume new goods.
1.1.5 Financial sector
The entrepreneur, willing to establish a firm for production of a new good,
takes a loan from a bank at real interest rate r(t) in order to buy a patent from
the R&D sector. The bank cannot make higher interest rate for the firm than
that on agents’ deposits because in this case the firm can attract investments
from other bank (because of the free entry condition in the bank sector) or
directly from people offering them the same rate r(t) of return as the bank
does. Banks can “create money” taking patents as security, thus giving more
loans than the total deposits of people. Actually, there is no restriction in the
model on how much loans a bank can give since the firms for sure will repay
4Different extension of equation (1.30) are possible, including the dependence on a weight
average of the distribution of labor across different technologies, which is reasonable (see e.g.
Aghion & Howitt, 1996, 1998; Sorger, 2011). This would cause only some technical burden,
therefore below we focus only on dynamics (1.30).
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their debts in the future. These debts are balanced in the bank accounting by
the values of patents that firms put in pledge.
Similar to Sorger (2011) we denote the present value of the real profit flow
for the firm producing product q 2 [0;Q(t)] over interval [t;+¥) as
v(t;q) =
Z ¥
t
exp

 
Z s
t
r(q)dq

p(s;q)ds; (1.31)
which, on the other hand, is the debt that the q-th firm owes to the bank.
Since the market for patents is competitive we assume that the R&D indus-
try as a whole makes no profit, and the firm who buys a patent makes zero net
profit5 too, because of the free entry assumption. This idea of intertemporal
zero net profit constraint (as in Romer, 1990) is taken from G. M. Grossman
and Helpman (1989). Thus, the market price v(t;Q(t)), of the patents produced
at time t is determined by the zero-profit condition
v(t;Q(t)) Q˙(t) = LQ(t); (1.32)
which results from the fact that the R&D industry creates Q˙(t) patents in a unit
of time at t and the cost is what is paid for the involved labor LQ(t).
The time-derivative of expression (1.31) for the price of a new patent q =
Q(t) yields the following no-arbitrage condition
d
dt v(t;Q(t))
v(t;Q(t))
+
p(t;Q(t))
v(t;Q(t))| {z }
rate of return on the ownership
= r(t)+
Q˙(t)
v(t;Q(t))
Z ¥
t
e 
R s
t r(q)dq ¶p
¶q
(s;q)

q=Q(t)
ds| {z }
rate of novelty premium
:
(1.33)
It states that the rate of return on the ownership of a firm — consisting of
the rate of capital gain
d
dt v(t;Q(t))
v(t;Q(t)) and the profit rate
p(t;Q(t))
v(t;Q(t)) — has to equal
the real interest rate r(t) plus the rate of novelty premium (as we call the last
term). It differs from the no-arbitrage condition in the literature (e.g. Romer,
1990; G. M. Grossman & Helpman, 1991a, Chapter 3) by the rate of novelty
premium that appears because of the heterogeneity of goods.
In special cases the improper integral in (1.33) can be expressed via v(t;Q(t)).
Then, no-arbitrage condition (1.33) yields an explicit expression for the real in-
terest rate r(t). Such expression is more convenient for calculating the general
equilibrium, than the original integral equation (1.31) in zero-profit condition
(1.32).
5The net profit of the firm is its operating profit p minus taxes (that will be introduced later)
and minus interest on debt.
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1.1.6 Market clearing
We have already taken into account the clearing on product market (1.25)
where production equals consumption. In view of the technological assump-
tion in Section 1.1.3 we can express the total labor in production as
LP(t) =
Z Q(t)
0
C(t;q)dq: (1.34)
The labor market is cleared by the full employment condition
LP(t)+LQ(t) = L(t); (1.35)
where the total labor L(t) is given exogenously by (1.4).
Financial market is cleared by intertemporal zero-profit condition (1.32)
for the firms, meaning that all invented technologies are purchased by the firms
whose debts to the banks are balanced with the values of their patents. The
banks have zero profit too, because of the absence of entry barriers for new
banks. Thus, the real interest rate r(t) on firms’ debts is the same as that on
agents’ deposits.
1.1.7 Succinct format of the general equilibrium equations
With the use of (1.31) and (1.29) the zero-profit condition (1.32) in the R&D
sector takes the form
LQ(t) = b (Q(t))jLQ(t)
Z ¥
t
e 
R s
t r(q)dq 1 a
a
C(s;Q(t))ds: (1.36)
Due to (1.34) the labor balance equation (1.35) becomes
LQ(t) = L(t) 
Z Q(t)
0
C(t;q)dq: (1.37)
The dynamics of the variety frontier Q is as in (1.30)
Q˙(t) = b (Q(t))j LQ(t); Q(0) = Q0 > 0: (1.38)
The above three equations involve the total consumptionC(t;q) given by (1.25),
which in view of (1.23) takes the form
C(t;q) = a
Z t
t w
(m(t ; t;q;Q(t)))
1
1 a
g(t)
Rr(t ; t)h(t)n(t ; t)dt : (1.39)
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Here
g(t)
Z t+w
t
Rr(t ;s)Rm(t;s)M(t;s)ds (1.40)
and M(t;s) is a substitution for G(t;s) = a
a
1 aM(t ;s), so that
M(t ;s)
Z Q(s)
0
(m(t;s;q;Q(s)))
1
1 a dq: (1.41)
The integral M(t;s) represents how much the agent in cohort t enjoys the va-
riety of goods at time s  t , and g(t) is the present discounted value of this
propensity for a newborn at t . So we have the three equations (1.36)–(1.38) for
three unknown functions, Q, LQ, and r which determine the general equilib-
rium. Further we use these equations for analytical and numerical investigation
of the economy.
1.2 Analysis of general equilibrium
Notice that because of the assumption that for any time t there is a subset
of goods in [0;Q(t)] with nonzero measure, such that m(t ; t;q;Q(t)) > 0, the
integrals M(t; t) and g(t) are strictly positive for all t . Thus, the integral in
(1.37) of consumption (1.39) is also strictly positive since functions Rr , h and n
are strictly positive in the integration domain. Hence, there are always workers
in the production sector, meaning LQ(t)< L(t).
We also mention that expression (1.22) for the consumption expenditure
can be written in terms of h, g, and M defined in (1.24), (1.40), and (1.41)
E(t; t) = Rr(t; t)h(t)
M(t ; t)
g(t)
: (1.42)
1.2.1 Aggregated state variables
For better understanding of the model dynamics we introduce aggregated state
variables and derive corresponding aggregated equations. Integration of the
profit expression (1.27) over all existing products [0;Q(t)] yields
P(t) = I(t) LP(t); (1.43)
where we introduce the total profit P and income I of the firms
P(t) 
Z Q(t)
0
p(t;q)dq; (1.44)
I(t) 
Z Q(t)
0
p(t;q)C(t;q)dq: (1.45)
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Thus, (1.43) reads as the total profit of the firms equals their total incomeminus
the total labor expenses in production.
At equilibrium the total income of all firms in the economy is equal to the
aggregated expenditure for consumption,
I(t) =
Z t
t w
E(t; t)n(t; t)dt; (1.46)
where the expenditure E(t ; t) of each cohort t is defined in (1.42).
It follows from (1.34), (1.45), and (1.28) that the labor in production LP(t)
has the following simple relation with the total firms’ income I(t)
LP(t) = aI(t); (1.47)
and defines the total profit of firms
P(t) =
1 a
a
LP(t): (1.48)
Now let us aggregate the assets of individuals at time t,
A(t)
Z t
t w
a(t ; t)n(t; t)dt ; (1.49)
that are on deposits in the bank.
Recalling that newborns have no initial assets, see (1.7), we have the fol-
lowing formula for the derivative of A(t) obtained by time-differentiation of
(1.49) with the use of expression (1.2)
A˙(t) =
Z t
t w
a˙(t ; t)n(t; t)dt 
Z t
t w
a(t; t)m(t; t)n(t; t)dt: (1.50)
The aggregation of the budget constraints (1.13) over age cohorts givesZ t
t w
a˙(t; t)n(t ; t)dt =
Z t
t w
[l(t ; t)+(r(t)+m(t; t))a(t ; t) E(t; t)]n(t; t)dt:
Then equations (1.4), (1.46), and (1.50) yield the following asset balance equa-
tion:
A˙(t) = r(t)A(t)+L(t)  I(t): (1.51)
Thus, the aggregated assets A rise at the amount of interest rA and what is left
from the labor income L after the consumption expenses (equal to the total
income of all firms I).
18 Heterogeneous consumption in OLG model with horizontal innovations
We also introduce the aggregated value of all patents in the economy,
V (t)
Z Q(t)
0
v(t;q)dq; (1.52)
where v(t;q) is given by (1.31). Since the valueV (t) is equal to the firms’ debt
to the bank we have the following differential equation for V (t):
V˙ (t) = r(t)V (t)+LQ(t) P(t); (1.53)
meaning that the debt (besides interest rV ) raises with the loan for research
LQ and falls with the current firms’ profit P payed to the banks. Equation
(1.53) can also be obtained by differentiation of (1.52) with respect to time,
taking into account expression (1.31), definition (1.43), and the R&D zero-
profit condition (1.32).
Proposition 1 The total value of patents V (t) and the total assets of the indi-
viduals A(t) are governed by the same differential equation
A˙(t) = r(t)A(t)+L(t)  1
a
LP(t); (1.54)
and are related as follows:
V (t) = A(t)+ye
R t
0 r(s)ds;
where y is a constant.
Proof See Appendix 1.5.1.
Although the dynamics of the aggregated assets and the firms’ debts is
described by the same differential equation (1.54) they are not equal in general
(y 6= 0), as it will be shown by the next proposition.6
It shows that the aggregated real assets, A(t), are bounded due to the con-
stant wages, and the no-bequest scenario of the model.
Proposition 2 If the real interest rate r and total labor endowment L are
bounded (for all t, jr(t)j < r¯ and L(t)  L¯), then the aggregated assets of the
individuals are also bounded: jA(t)j< A¯.
6We do not require the aggregated assets of agents to be equal to the total debts of firms like
it is done in (Sorger, 2011), because in our model the optimal consumption profile and invest-
ments of a finitely living agent are completely defined via initial condition (1.7) and terminal
conditions (1.8), like in (Cass & Yaari, 1967; d’Albis & Augeraud-Ve´ron, 2011), which is not
the case for infinitely living households in (Sorger, 2011), where he needs additional condition
V (t) A(t) to specify general equilibrium.
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Proof See Appendix 1.5.2. 
Corollary 1 If the value of all patents in the economy V is bounded (V (t) V¯
for all t) and the real interest rate converges to a constant, r(t)! rˆ with t!¥,
then rˆ  0 or V (t) = A(t) for all t.
Proof See Appendix 1.5.3. 
Bounded growth
If we assume bounded growth of the variety frontier Q(t)! Q¯, so that due to
(1.38) we have LQ(t)! 0, then asset markets are balanced (A(t)  V (t)) and
the long run interest rate is positive (r(t)! rˆ > 0) as shown by the following
proposition. Thus, the imbalance between asset markets (A(t)<V (t) for all t)
implies growth.
Proposition 3 Let there exist a general equilibrium with bounded Q, with
bounded real interest rate r and bounded total labor endowment L. Let also
r(t)! rˆ and L(t)! Lˆ with t! ¥. Then the value of patents V is balanced by
aggregated assets A for all t and has the following limit
A(t) =V (t)! 1 a
a
Lˆ
rˆ
> 0;
where limit of the real interest rate is positive rˆ > 0.
Proof See Appendix 1.5.5. 
Obviously, utility in (1.56) is also bounded in this case.
Notice that the corner solution (LQ(t) 0) is the special case of the bounded
growth Q(t)! Q¯, where LQ(t) = 0 for all t  t¯, i.e. there is no growth of
Q(t) = Q¯ since R&D is absent.
From now on we will consider only unbounded growth of Q. Moreover,
we assume that there is always R&D activity, LQ(t) > 0 for all t. Then, from
(2.2) and (1.32) we obtain the price of a new patent
v(t;Q(t)) =
1
b (Q(t))j
: (1.55)
The newest patent becomes cheaper as Q ! ¥ because of the knowledge
spillover, j > 0, while without spillovers, j = 0, its price stays constant
v(t;Q(t)) = 1=b .
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1.2.2 Utility of an agent
We are to analyze the growth of the expected life-time aggregated utility (1.12)
of a representative individual in cohort t (see Appendix 1.6.1)
u(t) = (a h(t))a (g(t))1 a ; (1.56)
where h and g are defined in (1.24) and (1.40). This expression shows that u(t)
depends positively on the human wealth of the agent and on the discounted
integralM defined in (1.41) representing howmuch the agent values the variety
of goods.
1.2.3 Benchmark case of homogeneous consumption with j = 1
Let us consider the usually studied in the literature (e.g. Dixit & Stiglitz, 1977)
the case when
m(t ; t;q;Q) 1;
meaning that all existing products are equally appreciated by the consumer.
We will show that in the case of knowledge spillover with j = 1, as in Romer
(1990); G. M. Grossman and Helpman (1991a); Aghion and Howitt (1992),
growth of variety frontier is exponential and a balanced growth path is found
analytically.
Remark 1 Because of the homogeneity (m(t ; t;q;Q) 1), the consumption in
(1.39)
C(t;q) =
LP(t)
Q(t)
;
the profit in (1.29)
p(t;q) =
P(t)
Q(t)
;
and, consequently, the patent value
v(t;q) =
V (t)
Q(t)
;
defined in (1.31), do not depend on q.
Hence, for an internal solution LQ(t) > 0, we can calculate, using equation
(1.55), the value of patents in the economy as follows
V (t) = Q(t)v(t;Q(t)) = Q(t)
LQ(t)
Q˙(t)
=
1
b
; (1.57)
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that happens to be constant. No-arbitrage condition (1.33) yields the following
expression for real interest rate
r(t) = b

LP(t)
a
  Lˆ

: (1.58)
The next proposition finds a “balanced growth path” corresponding to the ex-
ponential growth of the variety of goods in the economy.
First we find relation between labor endowment L defined in (1.4) and
human wealth h defined in (1.24) when r(t) 0. For the sake of simplicity we
consider the stationary population and labor endowment.
Definition 1 We say that an economy has stationary population and labor en-
dowment if the functions n(t ; t) and l(t; t) depend only on the age t t 2 [0;w]
of the agent.
Equivalently we can say that the number of newborns n(t ;t) n0 is constant
and the mortality rate m(t ; t)  mˆ(t   t) and the labor endowment l(t ; t) 
lˆ(t  t) depend only on the age t  t .
Lemma 1 Let the population and labor endowment be stationary (see Defini-
tion 1). If the real interest rate is zero (r(t)  0) in the equilibrium, then the
human wealth, given by (1.24), is constant h(t) hˆ, having the expression:
hˆ=
Z w
0
e 
R V
0 mˆ(J)dJ lˆ(V)dV ; (1.59)
and the total labor endowment is also constant and equals L(t)  Lˆ = n0 hˆ,
where n0 is the number of newborns.
Proof See Appendix 1.5.4. 
The following Proposition finds an explicit solution of our general equilib-
rium model, when Q grows exponentially.
Proposition 4 In the economy with stationary population and labor endow-
ment if goods are homogeneous (m(t; t;q;Q) 1) and the knowledge spillover
parameter is equal to one (j = 1), then:
(i) the triple LP(t)  aLˆ, r(t)  0, Q(t) = Q0 eb (1 a)Lˆ t is a steady state
solution of the system (1.36)–(1.38),
(ii) g in (1.40) grows exponentially w.r.t. time of births t:
g(t) = gˆ eb (1 a)Lˆt ; (1.60)
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where constant gˆ= Q0
Z w
0
e(b (1 a)Lˆ 
r
1 a )V 
R V
0 mˆ(J)dJ dV .
Proof See Appendix 1.5.6. 
It follows from Lemma 1 and (1.60) that for j = 1 the growth of the life-
time aggregated utility (1.56) is unbounded as the birth time of generations
t ! ¥:
u(t) =
 
a hˆ
a
(gˆ)1 a eb (1 a)
2Lˆt ! ¥:
Aggregated assets A cannot grow infinitely because of the Proposition 2,
thus converge to a constant Aˆ.
For smaller values of spillover parameter j , we show that the real interest
rate r and the shares of labor Lp and LQ converge to those of the balanced
growth path.
1.2.4 Homogeneous consumption with j < 1
In this case and we can obtain the real interest rate so we have
r(t) =
b
(Q(t))1 j

1 a
a
LP(t) jLQ(t)

; (1.61)
since LQ(t) > 0, see Appendix 1.7 for general proof. We can calculate the
value of patents in the economy with the use of (1.32) and (1.38) as
V (t) =
Z Q(t)
0
v(t;q)dq
= Q(t)v(t;Q(t))
= Q(t)
LQ(t)
Q˙(t)
=
(Q(t))1 j
b
; (1.62)
where we take into account that, because of the homogeneity (m(t; t;q;Q) 
1), the consumption C(t;q) in (1.39), the profit p(s;q) in (1.29), and, con-
sequently, the patent value v(t;q) defined in (1.31), do not depend on q, see
Remark 1.
Because of the assumed unbounded growth of the variety frontier, Q(t)!
¥ as t ! ¥, see Fig. 1.1 b), and the first equation in (1.61), we have that
r(t)! 0, see Fig. 1.1 a). Thus, from equation (1.54) we obtain the convergence
LP(t)! aLˆ; LQ(t)! (1 a)Lˆ; (1.63)
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see Fig. 1.1 c). The product variety frontier, Q(t), grows asymptotically as
driven by the equation
Q˙(t) = b (1 a)Lˆ(Q(t))j ;
which implies the unbounded growth of patents’ value (1.62):
V (t) =
(Q(t))1 j
b
! ¥;
as t ! ¥, see Fig. 1.1 d). Hence, V (t) > A(t) for all t since the assets A
are bounded due to Proposition 2 and the patents’ value V cannot intersect A
transversely because both V and A are governed by the same ODE (1.54), see
Proposition 1.
The growth of the life-time aggregated utility u(t) = (a h(t))a (g(t))1 a
is also unbounded since g(t)  Q(t)! ¥ due to (1.40)–(1.41) and h(t)!
hˇ 2 (0; hˆ] due to (1.24).
The unbounded growth of the utility u(t)means that the future generations
will live unrestrictedly better than their presently living ancestors. This hap-
pens because in equilibrium the agent enjoys equal consumption of all goods,
and her instantaneous utility can be described via the common consumption
level c(t) = c(t ; t;q) and variety frontier Q(t) as Q(t)c(t)a . It is clear, that
the Q(t)-elasticity of the instantaneous utility is greater than its c(t)-elasticity,
since 1 > a . Thus, the gain in utility from the increase of the variety frontier
Q(t) overweighs the loss from the decrease of the consumption level c(t) so
that the utilities of agents grow proportionally to (Q(t))1 a .
1.2.5 Heterogeneous consumption
We assume that at equilibrium LQ(t) > 0 for all t and agents have heteroge-
neous preferences, such that
m(t ; t;q;Q) = e g(Q q);
where g > 0 is the parameter of heterogeneity7. This corresponds to the special
case, where m0(t ; t;Q) = e gQ and m1(q) = eg q. Thus, we can calculate the
real interest rate r from (1.102), obtained in Appendix 1.7, as follows
r(t) =
b
(Q(t))1 j

Q(t)

(1 a)
aM˜(Q(t))
LP(t)  g1 a LQ(t)

 jLQ(t)

;
(1.64)
7The case of g = 0 corresponds to homogeneous goods studied above.
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where
M˜(Q(t)) =
1 a
g
(1  e  g1 aQ(t)): (1.65)
The value of patents can be expressed in the following way, with the use
of (1.32) and (1.38) (see Appendix 1.6.2)
V (t) =
1 a
gb
1  e  g1 aQ(t)
Q(t)j
: (1.66)
If we assume convergence to a steady state r(t)! rˆ, then it follows from
(1.64) that
(1 a)
aM˜(Q(t))
LP(t)  g1 a LQ(t)! 0;
because otherwise r(t)! ¥ as Q(t)! ¥. Since M˜(Q(t))! 1 ag in (1.65)
when Q(t)! ¥, we have
LP(t)  a1 a LQ(t)! 0
and, taking into account labor balance (1.37), we obtain
LP(t) aL(t)! 0:
The value of patents in the economy (1.66) tends to zero V (t) ! 0 as time
t ! ¥. According to Corollary 1, A(t)  V (t) or rˆ  0. We study the second
type of solution, rˆ 0, that is confirmed by the numerical calculation depicted
in Fig. 1.2.
The life-time utility of an agent u(t) = (a h(t))a (g(t))1 a in (1.56) is
bounded, because h(t) ! const and M˜(Q(t)) = M(Q(t)) ! 1 ag (therefore
g(t) ! const). The intuition for the boundedness of the expected life time
utility u is as follows. When the variety frontier Q increases the consump-
tion profile, roughly speaking, shifts to the newer goods, thus exponentially
(in Q) decreasing the consumption of the older goods, because of the func-
tion m(q;Q) = e g(Q q) in (1.39). Exponential decrease in consumption of the
older goods prevails over the increase of their variety Q. As a result the in-
stantaneous utility converges to a limit constant so, consequently, does the life
time utility u(t).
We have qualitatively different behavior of V and u in the homogeneous
(m  1) and the heterogeneous (m  e g(Q q)) cases. Mathematically, this
difference is conditioned by the properties of the integral M˜(Q). Intuitively
speaking, the reason for vanishing V and bounded u in the heterogeneous case
is the abandonment of older goods because of the agent’s preferences.
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Figure 1.1: The case of homogeneous goods m  1. Labor endowment is
l(t; t) = 0:3 for t  t  45 and l(t; t) = 0 after retirement (t  t > 45), where
we consider the agent’s life from her adulthood. Mortality m(t; t) = 0 for
t t <w , life horizon w = 80, age concentration of people n(t; t) = n0 = 100,
initial frontier of the products’ variety Q0 = 1000, b = 0:0002, j = 0:5, indi-
vidual discounting r = 0:01. a) Real interest rate r. b) The variety frontier Q.
c) The relative labor employed in R&D LQ=L (solid line with dashed line de-
picting the linear extrapolation) and its limit value 1 a (dashed-dotted line).
d) Dynamics of total assets A (solid line) and value of patents V (dashed line).
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Figure 1.2: The case of heterogeneous goods g = 0:0004. Labor endowment is
l(t; t) = 0:3 for t  t  45 and l(t; t) = 0 after retirement (t  t > 45), where
we consider the agent’s life from her adulthood. Mortality m(t; t) = 0 for
t t <w , life horizon w = 80, age concentration of people n(t; t) = n0 = 100,
initial frontier of the products’ variety Q0 = 1000, b = 0:0002, j = 0:5, indi-
vidual discounting r = 0:01. a) Real interest rate r. b) The variety frontier Q.
c) The relative labor employed in R&D LQ=L (solid line with dashed line de-
picting the linear extrapolation) and its limit value 1 a (dashed-dotted line).
d) Dynamics of total assets A (solid line) and value of patents V (dashed line).
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1.3 Discussion of the model and extensions
1.3.1 Efficiency and fiscal policy
In this subsection we investigate how the government can improve the utility
of the agents in the long run by taxing the firms and paying subsidies and
pensions to the agents. We assume that there is a constant tax rate d < 1 payed
by each firm from its profit p(t;q) and the sum of the collected taxes d P(t)
are distributed among the currently living agents of different generations in the
form of lump subsidies. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the collected
taxes are divided equally among the newborns and put on their deposits. The
equation for government balance reads as
a(t ;t)n(t;t) = d P(t): (1.67)
Taking the expression (1.48) for the total profit P(t) we obtain the following
initial assets of the agents (instead of (1.7)):
a(t;t) = d
1 a
a
LP(t)
n(t ;t)
: (1.68)
The value v(t;q) in (1.31) of the patent to produce product q decreases to
v(t;q) = (1 d )
Z ¥
t
exp

 
Z s
t
r(q)dq

p(s;q)ds; (1.69)
while the agent’s human wealth h(t) in (1.24) is augmented by nonhuman
wealth from the subsidies a(t;t)  0. Thus, in all the previous formulas we
should replace h(t) with the total wealth a(t;t)+ h(t). Taking into account
these changes, the aggregated equations (1.51) and (1.53) take the form
A˙(t) = r(t)A(t)+L(t)  I(t)+d P(t); (1.70)
V˙ (t) = r(t)V (t)+LQ(t)  (1 d )P(t); (1.71)
and similarly as in (1.54) we have
A˙(t) = r(t)A(t)+L(t)  1 d (1 a)
a
LP(t): (1.72)
Following the same arguments as before we can study the general equilibrium
under simplifying assumptions, L(t)! Lˆ, etc.
Real interest rate
We can state that if LQ(t)> 0 the real interest rate can be calculated as follows.
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Homogeneous consumption (m(t; t;q;Q) 1):
r(t) =
b
(Q(t))1 j

(1 a)(1 d )
a
LP(t) jLQ(t)

: (1.73)
Heterogeneous consumption (m(t ; t;q;Q) e g(Q q) with g > 0):
r(t) =
b
(Q(t))1 j

Q(t)

(1 a)(1 d )
aM˜(Q(t))
LP(t)  g1 a LQ(t)

 jLQ(t)

;
(1.74)
where M˜(Q(t)) = 1 ag (1  e
 g
1 aQ(t)).
Labor shares
With both homogenous and heterogeneous consumptions we have
LP(t)! a1 d (1 a) Lˆ; LQ(t)!
(1 d )(1 a)
1 d (1 a) Lˆ; (1.75)
extending (1.63) to the case of taxation and distribution of subsidies. Hence,
the tax increases the amount of labor in production and decreases it in R&D,
so that the product variety frontier Q(t) grows asymptotically slower with the
tax d > 0 then without it d = 0, which can be seen from its asymptotical
differential equation
Q˙(t) = b
(1 d )(1 a)
1 d (1 a) Lˆ(Q(t))
j :
Using the explicit formula for the solution of this equation we can write
Q(t)jd=0
Q(t)jd>0
!
8<:

1+ da1 d
 1
1 j
; j < 1
exp

b Lˆ(1 a)ad
1 d (1 a) t

; j = 1
; (1.76)
where Q(t)jd>0 denotes the variety frontier, when tax rate is positive, d > 0,
while Q(t)jd=0 is the variety frontier for economy without taxation.
Aggregated utility
Now we can ask the question: Can the fiscal policy improve the expected
life-time aggregated utility (1.56) of a representative agents in the long run?
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Substitution of the expression for nonhuman capital (1.68) in the utility of
cohort t brings it to the form:
u(t) = aa (a(t;t)+h(t))a (g(t))1 a : (1.77)
We see that u(t) depends positively on the agents’ human wealth and on the
discounted integralM defined in (1.41).
Further we assume that population is stationary and labor is fixed, i.e. den-
sity n(t ; t) and labor endowment l(t; t) lˆ(t t) depend only on the age t t ,
see Definition 1. Hence, the total labor endowment is constant, so we can take
L(t) = n0 l¯, where n0 = n(t;t) is the constant number of newborns, and l¯ is
the constant effective labor of a newborn:
l¯ 
Z w
0
lˆ(J)e 
R V
0 mˆ(J)dJ dV ; (1.78)
which coincides with the limit of human wealth l¯ = hˆ in the case of rˆ = 0, see
expression (1.59) in Lemma 1. Thus, when t ! ¥ we have from (1.68) and
(1.75) the initial assets converging as follows:
a(t;t)! d (1 a)
1 d (1 a) l¯: (1.79)
In order to answer the question of the efficiency of fiscal policy we consider
the asymptotics of the utility u(t) in (1.77) separately in homogeneous and
heterogeneous cases.
Long run efficiency of the fiscal policy
We will show, that the fiscal policy in hand can improve well-being (u(t)) of
the future generations with heterogeneous consumption, which is not the case
for homogeneous consumption. We check if, for all sufficiently high times of
birth t , life time utility in the economy with taxation, u(t)jd>0, is grater than
that without taxation, u(t)jd=0.
Homogeneous consumption. In the homogeneous case r(t)! 0 when t !
¥, hence, according to Lemma 1, h(t)! hˆ = l¯ when t ! ¥. Thus, with the
use of (1.76) and (1.79) we can write for j 2 [0;1) the following limit for ratio
of utilities with tax and without tax (see Appendix 1.6.3)
u(t)jd=0
u(t)jd>0
! (1 d (1 a))a

1+
da
1 d
 1 a
1 j
>
1 d (1 a)
(1 d )1 a  1: (1.80)
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When j = 1 this utility ratio tends to infinity with t ! ¥, due to the ratio in
(1.76). Thus, in the homogeneous case the fiscal policy cannot improve agents’
utilities in the long run.8
Heterogeneous consumption. Below we show that in contrast with the ho-
mogeneous case an appropriate fiscal policy of the government may improve
the agents’ utility in the long run. It is shown in Section 1.2.5 that r(t)! rˆ 0.
The limit of human wealth (1.24), as t ! ¥, can be calculated as follows
h(t)!
Z w
0
lˆ(J)e rˆV 
R V
0 mˆ(J)dJ dV  h¯ (1.81)
where h¯ does not depend on d . The integral in (1.77), in contrast to the homo-
geneous case, converges to a constant independent of tax rate d :
g(t)! 1 a
g
Z w
0
e 
r a rˆ
1 a V 
R V
0 mˆ(J)dJ dV  g¯: (1.82)
Then, we can make the following approximations of the asymptotic expected
utility (see Appendix 1.6.4)
u(t)jd ! aa

d (1 a)
1 d (1 a) l¯+ h¯
a
g¯1 a : (1.83)
where l¯ is defined in (1.78). It is seen from (1.83), that the implementation
of the fiscal policy (d > 0) increases the agents’ expected life-time aggregated
utilities in the long run
lim
t!¥
u(t)jd=0
u(t)jd>0
 1: (1.84)
Notice, that these results hold for any reasonable functions of mortality, mˆ ,
and labor endowment, lˆ.
1.3.2 Sources of heterogeneity
There are two, mathematically equivalent, sources of heterogeneity of goods.
The first is that we have already described, where goods are weighted hetero-
geneously in the agent’s utility function. The other source of heterogeneity
is the potential difference in productivity of labor allocated to different firms.
8Note that for j < 0 even small tax rate d > 0 improves agents’ utilities in the long run,
because the derivative ddd
u(t)jd=0
u(t)jd>0

d=0
= aj 1 a1 j becomes negative. A value j < 0 means that
past inventions make it more difficult to find new ideas, which we think to be unlikely.
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That can be described by the same model after renormalization. Indeed, let
z (t;q;Q(t)) be the amount of physical units of the good q that can be pro-
duced with one unit of labor, then equation for the profit (1.27) would take the
form
p(t;q) = p˜(t;q)C˜(t;q)  C˜(t;q)
z (t;q;Q(t))
; (1.85)
where p˜(t;q) is the price of one physical unit of the good q, C˜(t;q) is the
aggregated production (and consumption) in physical units of the good q. Let
the agent value all goods equally maximizing her following expected lifetime
utility
u(t) =
Z t+w
t
e r(t t) 
R t
t m(t;q)dq
Z Q(t)
0
c˜(t ; t;q)a dqdt; (1.86)
subject to the dynamic budget constraint
a˙(t ; t) = l(t; t)+(r(t)+m(t ; t))a(t; t) 
Z Q(t)
0
p˜(t;q) c˜(t ; t;q)dq; (1.87)
with boundary conditions
a(t;t) = 0; a(t ;t+w) = 0; (1.88)
where c˜(t; t;q) is her consumption in physical units. Then, if we change the
variables as follows
p˜(t;q) =
p(t;q)
z (t;q;Q(t))
; c˜(t ; t;q) = c(t ; t;q)z (t;q;Q(t));
so that
C˜(t;q) =C(t;q)z (t;q;Q(t));
then equation (1.85) for the profit will coincide with (1.27) and problem (1.86)–
(1.88) will take the form (1.5)–(1.8), where
m (z (t;q;Q(t)))a :
Thus, the performed analysis is also applicable to the problem with hetero-
geneous productivity of labor, but with a different meanings of the function
m.
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1.3.3 Economic growth
So far we have studied only the growth of agents’ utilities as indicator of pros-
perity. However, measuring goods in physical units as we did in Section 1.3.2
we can also discuss economic growth in terms of production and consumption.
If we assume limited labor endowment L the economy can grow only due to
increase in productivity of labor z (t;q;Q(t)), introduced in Section 1.3.2. The
growth can be endogenous if the productivity of labor depends on the state
variable Q(t).
We can consider a function m in problem (1.5) in the form
m(t; t;q;Q(t)) (z (t;q;Q(t)))a m˜(t; t;q;Q(t)); (1.89)
where the function m˜, inducing the actual agent’s preferences, is bounded,
while the function z (q; t;Q(t)), describing the dependence of the productivity
upon the variety frontier Q(t), may grow unboundedly when Q(t)! ¥. Thus,
we would have an unbounded growth of per capita consumption (in physical
units) i.e. an infinite economic growth.
The functional form of z (t;q;Q(t)) is supposed to be chosen to fit an ob-
served path of the per capita consumption (Jones, 1995b), but this is beyond
the scope of the present study.
1.4 Conclusions and prospects
We suggest an endogenous growth model of an economy, where technological
growth is promoted by the entrepreneurial activity of new firms. The liquidity
for these new enterprises is provided by the banking sector that de jure owns
all intellectual property. We interpret the technological growth as a growth of
the variety of goods. The question of how productivity of labor depends on the
variety of available technologies (goods) still needs to be answered. One can
try to determine this dependence empirically, but we believe that the produc-
tivity of labor should be related with qualification, hence education should be
explicitly included in the model as a new decision variable of the individuals.
Heterogeneity of consumption (m(t; t;q;Q)= e g(Q q), where g > 0) brings
the following qualitative effects. Firstly, the total value of patents V become
bounded with zero limitV (t)! 0 when t!¥ (in case of knowledge spillovers,
j > 0), thus balancing savings of agents and values of patents in the long run
(V (t) A(t)! 0). Secondly, the growth of the expected life-time aggregated
utilities of agents becomes bounded. Finally, the general equilibrium with het-
erogeneous consumption can loose its dynamic efficiency. So that it becomes
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possible to introduce a fiscal policy that improves all agents’ utilities in the
long run. Dynamic inefficiency is observed in OLG models quite often, but in
our model general equilibrium is inefficient only when consumption is hetero-
geneous.
In the case of constant labor endowment and stationary population con-
suming homogeneous goods we have found the simple steady steady state so-
lution with zero real interest rate and (r  0) and constant share of labor in
production (LP=L a) with knowledge spillover parameter j = 1. This solu-
tion sustain exponential growth of goods’ variety. The same interest rate and
labor distribution happen to be an attractor for the solutions in homogeneous
cases with j < 1 and heterogeneous cases with j < 0. Thus, in all cases the
variety of goods can grow unboundedly.
Since the general equilibrium can be numerically calculated without any
steady state assumptions and with arbitrary exogenous population dynamics
the model allows to investigate the effect of different shocks including demo-
graphical changes. The proposed model allows for introduction of functional
dependence of labor productivity on the goods’ variety frontier, thus describ-
ing the endogenous growth of production. Finding such dependence that would
mitigate the scale effect could be the topic for further research.
Appendix
1.5 Proofs
1.5.1 Proposition 1
Proof Let us substitute profit expression (1.43) into differential equation
(1.53) for V and use labor balance (1.35). Thus, we obtain exactly the same
equation (1.51) as for the aggregated assets A. One can check that the substi-
tution of the relation
V (t) = A(t)+ye
R t
0 r(s)ds
into equation (1.53) gives equation (1.51). Moreover, due to (1.47) equation
(1.51) can be written in terms of labor, (1.54). 
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1.5.2 Proposition 2
Proof Expression (1.49), with a(t; t) taken from the solution of personal
budget constraints (1.13) same as in (Cass & Yaari, 1967), has the following
form
A(t) =
Z t
t w
n(t ; t)
Rm(t ; t)
Z t
t
Rm(t ;s)(l(t ;s) E(t;s)) ds dt
=
Z t
t w
n(t; t)
Z t
t
e 
R s
t (r(q)+m(t;q))dq (l(t;s) E(t ;s)) ds dt
=
Z t
t w
n(t; t)
Z t
t
e
R t
s r(q)dq n(t ;s)
n(t; t)
(l(t;s) E(t;s)) ds dt
=
Z t
t w
Z t
t
e
R t
s r(q)dqn(t;s)(l(t;s) E(t ;s)) ds dt
=
Z t
t w
e
R t
s r(q)dq
Z s
t w
n(t;s)(l(t;s) E(t ;s)) dt ds (1.90)
Since l(t;s) 0 and E(t ;s) 0 we have the following chain of inequalities
jA(t)j  ew r¯
Z t
t w
Z s
t w
n(t ;s)(l(t ;s)+E(t;s)) dt ds
 ew r¯
Z t
t w
Z t
t w
n(t ;s)(l(t ;s)+E(t;s)) dt ds
= ew r¯
Z t
t w
(L(s)+ I(s)) ds
= ew r¯
Z t
t w

L(s)+
LP(s)
a

ds
 ew r¯
Z t
t w

L¯+
L¯
a

ds
 w ew r¯ 1+a
a
L¯;
where we use expression (1.4) for total labor, balance equation (1.46) and re-
lation (1.47). 
1.5.3 Corollary 1
Proof Proposition 2 claims that the aggregated assets A in the economy are
always bounded. Since both A and V are bounded, the term with exponent in
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the relation
V (t) = A(t)+ye
R t
0 r(s)ds
from Proposition 1 is also bounded. This happens only if constant y = 0 (then
V (t) = A(t) for all t) or when the exponent exp
 R t
0 r(s)ds

is bounded. But we
have that r(t)! rˆ, hence boundedness of R t0 r(s)ds occurs only if rˆ  0. 
1.5.4 Lemma 1
Proof First we show that the human wealth h defined in (1.24) is constant:
h(t) 
Z t+w
t
Rm(t ;s) l(t;s)ds
=
Z t+w
t
e 
R s
t mˆ(q t)dq lˆ(s  t)ds
=
Z t+w
t
e 
R s t
0 mˆ(J)dJ lˆ(s  t)ds
=
Z w
0
e 
R V
0 mˆ(J)dJ lˆ(V)dV  hˆ; (1.91)
where we used the definition of Rm(t;s) in (1.19) along with r(t)  0. Then,
from the definition of L in (1.4) and expression (1.3) we have
L(t) 
Z t
t w
l(t ; t)n(t; t)dt
=
Z t
t w
lˆ(t  t)n(t;t)e 
R t
t mˆ(q t)dq dt
= n0
Z t
t w
lˆ(t  t) e 
R t t
0 mˆ(J)dJ dt
= n0
Z w
0
lˆ(V) e 
R V
0 mˆ(J)dJ dV = n0 hˆ: (1.92)

1.5.5 Proposition 3
Proof We consider two cases: inner and corner solutions.
Inner solution. If Q(t)! Q¯ and Q(t) < Q¯ for all t, then due to LQ(t)! 0
equation (1.102) yields a bounded real interest rate r with strictly positive limit:
lim
t!¥r(t) = rˆ = b Q¯
j 1 a
a
m1(Q¯)
1
1 a
M1(Q¯)
Lˆ> 0:
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From expression (1.31) and equation (1.29) we have bounded V due to the
boundedness of r and L
V (t) =
Z Q(t)
0
v(t;q)dq
=
Z Q(t)
0
Z ¥
t
e 
R s
t r(q)dqp(s;q)dsdq
=
Z ¥
t
e 
R s
t r(q)dq 1 a
a
Z Q(t)
0
C(s;q)dqds

Z ¥
t
e 
R s
t r(q)dq 1 a
a
Z Q(s)
0
C(s;q)dqds
=
Z ¥
t
e 
R s
t r(q)dq 1 a
a
LP(s)ds

Z ¥
t
e 
R s
t r(q)dq 1 a
a
L(s)ds=
1 a
a
Z ¥
t
e 
R s
t r(q)dqL(s)ds< ¥:
Since r¯ > 0 the upper bound of V (t) is finite and has the following limit with
t ! ¥
1 a
a
Z ¥
t
e 
R s
t r(q)dqL(s)d ! 1 a
a
Lˆ
Z ¥
t
e rˆ(s t)dq ds=
1 a
a
Lˆ
rˆ
:
Corner solution. If there exist a time t¯ such that LQ(t) = 0 and Q(t) = Q¯ for all
t  t¯. Convergence of r(t)! rˆ and L(t)! Lˆ> 0 results in bounded A, accord-
ing to Proposition 2. Hence, the total amount of assets A also converges to a
constant, A(t)! Aˆ, due to equation (1.54) from which we have the following
0= rˆAˆ  1 a
a
Lˆ; (1.93)
so that rˆ 6= 0 and Aˆ 6= 0. If rˆ > 0 then for t  t¯
V (t) =
Q(t)Z
0
v(t;q)dq=
Q¯Z
0
v(t;q)dq=
Q¯Z
0
¥Z
t
e 
R s
t r(q)dqp(s;q)dsdq
=
1 a
a
¥Z
t
e 
R s
t r(q)dq
Q¯Z
0
C(s;q)dqds
=
1 a
a
¥Z
t
e 
R s
t r(q)dqLP(s)ds
! 1 a
a
Lˆ
¥Z
t
e rˆ(s t)dq ds=
1 a
a
Lˆ
rˆ
= Aˆ> 0:
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The case of rˆ < 0 contradicts Proposition 1. It follows from equation (1.93)
that Aˆ< 0 when rˆ < 0. But according to the relation
V (t) = A(t)+ye
R t
0 r(s)ds
in Proposition 1 we haveV (t)! Aˆ so that Aˆ> 0 becauseV (t)> 0 by definition.
Then, in both inner and corner solutions we have rˆ > 0 and bounded V .
Thus, the balance A(t)V (t) follows from Corollary 1. 
1.5.6 Proposition 4
Proof We need to check if LP(t)  aLˆ, r(t)  0, and Q(t) = Q0 eb (1 a)Lˆ t
satisfy equations (1.36)–(1.38). It is easy to check that (1.36) is satisfied due
to the no-arbitrage condition in (1.61). The solution of (1.38) is obviously
Q(t) = Q0 eb (1 a)Lˆ t :
Let us check (1.37). From (1.41) it follows that
M(t ;s) = Q(s) = Q0 eb (1 a)Lˆ s:
Then from (1.40) we obtain expression (1.60) for g(t) as follows
g(t) 
Z t+w
t
Rr(t;s)Rm(t;s)M(t ;s)ds
= Q0 eb (1 a)Lˆt
Z t+w
t
e(b (1 a)Lˆ 
r
1 a )(s t) 
R s t
0 mˆ(J)dJ ds
= Q0 eb (1 a)Lˆt
Z w
0
e(b (1 a)Lˆ 
r
1 a )V 
R V
0 mˆ(J)dJ dV
= Q0 eb (1 a)Lˆt gˆ;
where the last integral is a constant denoted by gˆ. Thus, from (1.39) we have
C(t;q) = a
Z t
t w
h(t)
g(t)
Rr(t; t)n(t; t)dt
= a hˆ
Z t
t w
1
g(t)
e 
r
1 a (t t) n(t;t)e 
R t t
0 mˆ(J)dJ dt
= a hˆn0
Z t
t w
1
g(t)
e 
r
1 a (t t) e 
R t t
0 mˆ(J)dJ dt : (1.94)
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After substitution of g(t) from (1.60) and canceling the constant we obtain the
following expression with the use of the relation Lˆ= hˆn0 from Lemma 1
C(t;q) =
a hˆn0
Q0 gˆ
Z t
t w
e b (1 a)Lˆt e 
r
1 a (t t) 
R t t
0 mˆ(J)dJ dt
=
a hˆn0
Q0 gˆ
e b (1 a)Lˆ t
Z t
t w
eb (1 a)Lˆ(t t) 
r
1 a (t t) 
R t t
0 mˆ(J)dJ dt
=
a hˆn0
Q0 eb (1 a)Lˆ t gˆ
Z w
0
e(b (1 a)Lˆ 
r
1 a )V 
R V
0 mˆ(J)dJ dV
=
a hˆn0
Q0 eb (1 a)Lˆ t
=
a hˆn0
Q(t)
=
aLˆ
Q(t)
=
LP(t)
Q(t)
=
Lˆ LQ(t)
Q(t)
: (1.95)
Thus (1.37) is also satisfied. 
1.6 Calculations
1.6.1 Expression (1.56)
With the use of consumption (1.23) and relation G(t;s) = a
a
1 aM(t ;s)
u(t) =
t+wZ
t
e
 r(t t) 
tR
t
m(t;q)dq
Q(t)Z
0
m(t ; t;q;Q(t)) c(t ; t;q)a dqdt
=
t+wZ
t
e
 r(t t) 
tR
t
m(t;q)dq
(G(t; t))1 a (E(t; t))a dt
=
t+wZ
t
e
 r(t t) 
tR
t
m(t;q)dq
(a
a
1 aM(t;s))1 a

Rr(t; t)h(t)
M(t; t)
g(t)
a
dt
=

a
h(t)
g(t)
a t+wZ
t
Rr(t; t)Rm(t ; t)M(t ; t)dt
= (a h(t))a (g(t))1 a ;
we have (1.56).
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1.6.2 Expression (1.66)
V (t) =
Z Q(t)
0
v(t;q)dq
=
Z Q(t)
0
Z ¥
t
e 
R s
t r(q)dqp(s;q)dsdq
=
Z Q(t)
0
Z ¥
t
e 
R s
t r(q)dq

m(q;Q(s))
m(Q(t);Q(s))
 1
1 a
p(s;Q(t))dsdq
=
Z Q(t)
0
Z ¥
t
e 
R s
t r(q)dqe 
g
1 a (Q(t) q)p(s;Q(t))dsdq
=
Z ¥
t
e 
R s
t r(q)dqp(s;Q(t))
Z Q(t)
0
e 
g
1 a (Q(t) q) dqds
= M˜(Q(t))
Z ¥
t
e 
R s
t r(q)dqp(s;Q(t))ds= M˜(Q(t))v(t;Q(t))
= M˜(Q(t))
LQ(t)
Q˙(t)
=
M˜(Q(t))
bQ(t)j
=
1 a
gb
1  e  g1 aQ(t)
Q(t)j
:
1.6.3 Expression (1.84)
u(t)jd=0
u(t)jd>0
!
0@ l¯
d (1 a)
1 d (1 a) l¯+ l¯
1Aa1+ da
1 d
 1 a
1 j
= (1 d (1 a))a

1+
da
1 d
 1 a
1 j
> (1 d (1 a))a

1+
da
1 d
1 a
=
1 d (1 a)
(1 d )1 a  1:
1.6.4 Expression (1.83)
From expression (1.68) and limits (1.79), (1.81), and (1.82) we have the limit
of aggregated utility
u(t) = aa (a(t;t)+h(t))a (g(t))1 a
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= aa

d
1 a
a
LP(t)
n(t ;t)
+h(t)
a
(g(t))1 a
= ! aa

d (1 a)
1 d (1 a) l¯+ h¯
a
g¯1 a :
1.7 No-arbitrage condition for m= m0(t; t;Q)m1(q)
Let us rewrite expression (1.39) using the assumption
m(t ; t;q;Q) = m0(t; t;Q)m1(q):
Then we have
C(t;q) = a (m1(q))
1
1 a
Z t
t w
(m0(t; t;Q(t)))
1
1 a
g(t)
Rr(t ; t)h(t)n(t; t)dt
= (m1(q))
1
1 a f (t); (1.96)
where function f denotes the integral and function m1(q)> 0 is differentiable
for all q Q0. Then from (1.34) and (1.96) we have
LP(t) =
Z Q(t)
0
C(t;q)dq= f (t)
Z Q(t)
0
(m1(q))
1
1 a dq= f (t)M1(Q(t)): (1.97)
We can derive from (1.96) and (1.97) the following relations for C(s;q) and,
due to (1.29), for p(s;q):
C(s;q) =
(m1(q))
1
1 a
M1(Q(s))
LP(s); (1.98)
p(s;q) =
1 a
a
C(s;q) =
1 a
a
(m1(q))
1
1 a
M1(Q(s))
LP(s); (1.99)
where we introduce notation
M1(Q) =
Z Q
0
m1(q)
1
1 a dq; (1.100)
so that the integral defined in (1.41) takes the form
M(t ; t) = m0(t ; t;Q(t))
1
1 a M1(Q(t)):
Thus, we have the expression for the derivative of C(s;q) with respect to q
¶C
¶q
(s;q)

q=Q(t)
=
(m1(Q(t)))
a
1 a ¶m1
¶q (Q(t))
(1 a)M1(Q(s)) LP(s) =
C(s;Q(t))
1 a
¶m1
¶q (Q(t))
m1(Q(t))
;
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and, due to (1.29), the derivative of p(s;q):
¶p
¶q
(s;q)

q=Q(t)
=
1 a
a
¶C
¶q
(s;q)

q=Q(t)
=
p(s;Q(t))
1 a
¶m1
¶q (Q(t))
m1(Q(t))
: (1.101)
It is assumed that there is always R&D activity LQ(t) > 0. Due to (1.101),
(1.99), and (1.55) no-arbitrage condition (1.33) takes the form
r(t) = b
(Q(t))1 j

Q(t)

1 a
a
LP(t)
M˜(Q(t)))  
LQ(t)
1 a
¶m1
¶q (Q(t))
m1(Q(t))

 jLQ(t)

; (1.102)
where
M˜(Q(t)) =
M1(Q(t))
m1(Q(t))
1
1 a
:
This condition is easier to use instead of zero-profit condition (1.36) in the
R&D sector. Although condition (1.102) does not depend explicitly on the
functionm0(t ; t;Q), it is still affected bym0 through expressions (1.39), (1.40),
and (1.41). However, if the function m0 depends only on t , then it does not
influence the solution (LQ(t), r(t), Q(t)) of system ((1.37), (1.38), (1.102)) and
matters only for the utilities of the agents. Indeed, consumption profile (over
goods q and times t) of an agent would remain the same if she have changed
her weight function m proportionately for all available goods and times.
1.8 Iterative procedure to calculate general equilibrium
The expression for the real interest rate (1.102) allows to construct a simple
iterative procedure for numerical calculation of a general equilibrium in the
case of interior solution (LQ(t)> 0 for all t).
In order to solve system (1.37), (1.38), (1.102) first, we give the initial labor
in research LQ[1](t) in the time interval [0;T ], where T  w . With LQ[1](t)
we calculate the product variety domain Q[1](t) in [0;T ] from (1.38). Then,
we calculate the real interest rate r[1](t) in [0;T ] with the use of (1.102). The
functions Q[1](t) and r[1](t) determine the aggregated consumption of agents
C[1](t;q) in [w;T  w] by (1.39). Knowing C[1](t;q) we obtain the labor in
R&D for the next iteration, LQ[2](t), t 2 [w;T  w] with the formula (1.37)
and extrapolate it linearly to the whole interval [0;T ]. Then we continue in the
same way.
If the sequence of so defined iterations converges, then as a result we have
a numerical approximation of the general equilibrium with two allowances:
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finiteness of time horizon T and linear extrapolation to the ends of the time
interval.
There are two cases to be considered separately. The first case is when
consumers evaluate all goods homogenously ( ¶m1¶q (q) 0) and the second case
is when consumers value newest goods more ( ¶m1¶q (q)> 0 for all q 2 [0;Q(t)]).
Chapter 2
Optimal Control of
Heterogeneous Systems with
Endogenous Domain of
Heterogeneity
2.1 Introduction
Generally speaking, in our terminology heterogeneous control systems are rep-
resented by a family of controlled ODEs parameterized by a parameter q vary-
ing in a measurable space Q, called domain of heterogeneity. The family is
coupled by “aggregated states” (involving integration overQ) that enter in all
ODEs and in the respective initial conditions. For each q 2Q the respective
ODE has its own time-interval [q(q); q¯(q)] in which it matters, at the begin-
ning of which an initial condition is posed. A basic theory of optimal con-
trol problems for such heterogeneous systems is presented in (Veliov, 2008).
Applications in many areas are indicated in this study, including problems in
population dynamics, epidemiology, air pollution control, and several prob-
lems in economics. In (Veliov, 2008) the initial time q(q) for the q-th ODE is
exogenously given.
In order to explain what are the motivations for the present research, let us
consider a particular economic context originating from (Jones, 1976; Dixit &
Stiglitz, 1977) in which the parameter q is interpreted as an available technol-
ogy (or consumption good) and q(q) is the time at which the q-th technology
emerges. Then, in the spirit of the endogenous economic growth literature ,
43
44 Optimal Control of Heterogeneous Systems with Endogenous Domain of Heterogeneity
e.g. (Romer, 1990; G. M. Grossman & Helpman, 1991b; Jones, 1995a), q(q)
depends on the rate of technological advancement which depends, in its turn,
on the investments in R&D. That is, the time, q(q), of appearance of the q-th
technology is endogenous. Such a situation, where the domain of heterogene-
ity at each time is endogenously determined, is not covered by the results in
(Veliov, 2008) and by the existing literature. In the endogenous growth liter-
ature involving a variety of technologies/products it is assumed that the prod-
ucts are indistinguishable, therefore the amount of physical capital allocated to
production of each of them is equal (Barro & Martin, 2004). This reduces the
originally distributed optimal control problem to a lumped one.
In the present research we address the issue of endogenous domain of het-
erogeneity. The class of problems that we consider is relatively simple and
does not contain many of the economic applications. Such will be presented
in follow-up publications in economics-oriented journals. This is because here
we want to stress the mathematical challenges that the endogenous domain of
heterogeneity brings in the optimal control context. The main trouble is caused
by the fact that the objective value considered as a function of the control is,
in general, non-differentiable (in any reasonable space setting). This effect
does not arise in standard optimal control problems with smooth data if the
set of admissible controls is a subset of L¥. As a result of this intrinsic non-
differentiability, the necessary optimality condition of Pontryagin’s type takes
a non-standard form in which the adjoint systems is represented by a differen-
tial inclusion (rather than equation) although the data are assumed smooth with
respect to the state variables. However, this situation may happen only if the
optimal control is “irregular” with respect to the parameter of heterogeneity q,
which is hard to exclude a priori.
The “irregularity” of the optimal control that requires the abovementioned
non-standard form of the maximum principle does not happen in the economic
application we have in mind, thus it is perhaps mainly of “academic inter-
est”. If the optimal control is “regular” enough, the optimality conditions take
a form corresponding to the heuristic application of the Lagrange principle.
For example, it is possible to prove that the optimal control in the more spe-
cific problem, considered in (Skritek, Tsachev, & Veliov, 2014), satisfies the
regularity condition discussed above. As a consequence of this the optimal-
ity conditions of Pontryagins type, which are good enough for analytic and
numerical investigation can be obtained.
However, the trouble with non-differentiability of the objective function
still remains. It creates certain difficulties in the derivation of the optimality
condition in the form of global maximum principle, therefore we present it
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below in detail. The possible non-differentiability also requires a special care
about the numerical approaches to the problem based on gradient-type meth-
ods.
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 we formulate the prob-
lem and the assumptions. In Section 2.3 we derive a necessary optimality
condition without any a priori assumptions for the optimal control. In this op-
timality condition the adjoint variable satisfies a differential inclusion and the
maximization of the Hamiltonian takes the form of “min-max”. From here, un-
der certain regularity of the optimal control we derive also a Pontryagin-type
maximum principle. Section 2.4 presents a formula for the derivative of the
objective function with respect to the control from L¥ and a sufficient condi-
tion for its existence. Moreover, a version of the gradient projection method
in the control space is briefly described, which at each iteration involves only
controls with respect to which the objective function is differentiable. In Sec-
tion 2.5 we give two examples of non-differentiability which justify the special
treatment in the preceding two sections. Section 2.6 gives a stylized economic
example. In a simple case we obtain the solution analytically and show that
the existence issue is complicated: an optimal solution exists for some config-
urations of the parameters and fails to exist for others. Also, numerical results
are presented and interpreted. One longer proof is shifted to Appendix.
2.2 Formulation of the problem
Let [0;T ] be a fixed time-interval and let [0; Q¯] be an interval where the param-
eter of heterogeneity, q, will take values (here Q¯ > 0 could be +¥, in which
case the interval should be interpreted as [0;¥)). Denote D = [0;T ] [0; Q¯].
The state variables in the model below will be the functions1
x : D 7! Rn; Q : [0;T ] 7! [0; Q¯]; y : [0;T ] 7! Rm;
while u :D 7!U Rr will be a control function. The optimal control problem
we consider reads as follows:
max
u
Z T
0
Z Q(t)
0
L(t;q;x(t;q);Q(t);y(t);u(t;q))dqdt; (2.1)
subject to the equations
Q˙(t) = g(t;Q(t);y(t)); Q(0) = Q0  0; t 2 [0;T ]; (2.2)
1In economics q, for instance, can denote technology, Q the technological frontier, and y can
be some additional externality.
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b(t) x˙(t;q) = f
Figure 2.1: Increasing domain of heterogeneity
y(t) =
Z Q(t)
0
h(t;q;u(t;q))dq; (2.3)
x˙(t;q) = f (t;q;x(t;q);Q(t);y(t);u(t;q)); (2.4)
x(0;q) = x0(q); q 2 [0;Q0];
x(t;Q(t)) = xb(t); t 2 (0;T ];
u(t;q) 2U: (2.5)
Here
L : DRn [0; Q¯]RmU 7! R;
f : DRn [0; Q¯]RmU 7! Rn; g : DRm 7! R; h : DU 7! Rm;
x˙(t;q) is the derivative with respect to t.
The informal meaning is as follows, see Figure 2.1. Given a control func-
tion u with values inU , equations (2.2) and (2.3) define the interval [0;Q(t)] in
which the parameter q takes values at time t. The state y(t) represents an ag-
gregated (over the domain of heterogeneity [0;Q(t)]) quantity. Equation (2.4)
with the respective side conditions defines the distributed state x. Then the
objective functional (2.1) is to be maximized with respect to the control u.
Before giving the formal definition of the problem we enlist Standing As-
sumptions (i) – (vi) which will hold throughout the chapter:
(i) The setU  Rr is compact.
(ii) The functions L; f ;g;h are measurable in (t;q) and continuous in the rest
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of the variables, locally essentially bounded, differentiable in (x;Q;y), with lo-
cally Lipschitz partial derivatives, uniformly with respect to u 2U and (t;q) 2
D. The function h is locally Lipschitz continuous in u uniformly with respect
to (t;q) 2 D.
(iii) g(t;Q;y)a0> 0 for every (t;Q)2 [0;T ][Q0; Q¯] and every y=
R Q
0 h(t;q;u)dq
for some u 2U .
(iv) xb : [0;T ] 7!Rn is continuously differentiable, x0 : [0;Q0] 7!Rn is measur-
able and bounded.
Denote U = fu 2 L¥(D) : u(t;q) 2Ug. Since for any given u 2 U one
can represent
g(t;Q;y(t)) = g

t;Q;
Z Q
0
h(t;q;u(t;q))dq

and the function in the right-hand side is Lipschitz in Q, equation (2.2) has
locally a solutionQ=Q[u] and it is unique on its maximal interval of existence
in [0;T ].
Standing Assumption (v): For every u2U the solutionQ[u] exists in [0; Q¯]
on the whole interval [0;T ].
Given u 2U , we define for q 2 [0; Q¯]
q [u](q) =
8<:
0 if q 2 [0;Q0];
Q[u] 1(q) if q 2 (Q0;Q[u](T ));
T if q 2 [Q[u](T ); Q¯]:
(2.6)
The definition is correct, since Q[u] is invertible according to Assumption (iii)
and its image is [Q0;Q[u](T )], see Figure 2.1. Notice that q [u] is Lipschitz con-
tinuous with constant 1=a0 due to Assumption (iii). We extend the definition
of xb by setting
xb(t;q) =

x0(q) if q 2 [0;Q0];
xb(t) if q 2 (Q0; Q¯]: (2.7)
Then we may view (2.4) as a family of ODEs (one for each q 2 [0; Q¯]), where
the functions y = y[u] and Q = Q[u] are already defined from (2.2), (2.3) as
described above. For each such q the solution x[u] of (2.4) with the additional
condition x(q [u](q);q) = xb(q [u](q);q) locally exists and is unique on its max-
imal interval of existence in [q [u](q);T ]. We extend x[u] for q 2 (Q0; Q¯] and
t 2 [0;q [u](q)) as x[u](t;q) = xb(t).
Standing Assumption (vi): For every u2U and for almost every q2 [0; Q¯]
the solution x[u](;q) exists on [0;T ].
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Due to the continuous dependence of the solution of the ODE (2.4) on the
parameter q and on the initial data, and due to the measurability of a super-
position of a measurable and a continuous function, x[u] is measurable with
respect to q. Then the meaning of the optimization problem (2.1) is clear.
We mention that several of the Standing Assumptions could be relaxed,
however at a certain price. In some extensions this price is just a technical
complication, as for example considering a function h in (2.3) depending also
on x, or requiring only continuity (instead on Lipschitz continuity) with re-
spect to u in Assumption (ii). Other extensions require a substantial additional
analysis. For example, dependence of the side condition xb(t) on y or on an
additional non-distributed control v(t). A third class of extensions require con-
ceptual clarification. This concerns mainly Assumption (iii). How the solution
should be defined if Q(t) is not strictly monotone increasing? Apparently the
“right” definition depends on the particular application. All these extensions
have clear interpretations in several economic contexts and is investigated for
a particular economic models in forthcoming papers, see e.g. (Skritek et al.,
2014). In this study, however, we focus on the mathematical complication
that the endogenous heterogeneity brings already in the simplest case which is
general enough to cover some applications (see Section 2.6 for an example).
2.3 The optimality conditions
In this section we derive necessary optimality conditions of Pontryagin’s type
for the problem (2.1)–(2.5). What makes this derivation not a routine work, is
that the objective functional (2.1) is, in general, non-differentiable with respect
to the control function, as it will be demonstrated in Section 2.5. Moreover,
the form of the maximum principle a la Pontryagin is non-standard, in gen-
eral, although under an additional (non-restrictive for the typical applications)
condition it takes a form that could be heuristically derived by an appropriate
application of the Lagrange multiplier rule. The problem of existence of an
optimal solution is not systematically investigated in this chapter, although it
is also challenging, as we show in Section 2.6.
To make the expressions below more compact we interpret x, y and u as
columns, in contrast to the adjoint variables l and n that will be involved later,
which are viewed as row-vectors with corresponding dimensions.
We start with a variational analysis the result of which will be summarized
in Proposition 1 below. It will be used in the proofs of the three theorems to
follow in this and in the next section.
Let u 2 U be fixed and let us 2 U be a sequence of controls parame-
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terized by positive s ! 0. We shall denote by x;Q and y the values of the
state variables corresponding to the control u and by xs ;Qs and ys – the val-
ues of the state variables corresponding to the control us . Further, we denote
Du= us  u, DQ= Qs  Q, etc.
For the sequence of controls us we require that there exists a constant c
such that for all sufficiently small s
kDukL1(D)+kDykL1(0;T )+kDQkC(0;T )+ maxt2[0;T ]kDx(t; )kL1(0;Q¯)  cs ; (2.8)Z T
0
kDu(t; )kL¥(0;Q¯) dt+kDykL¥(0;T )+ maxt2[0;T ]kDx(t; )kL¥(0;Q¯)  c
p
s ; (2.9)
where kkC(0;T ) denotes themax-norm of the space of the continuous functions
on [0;T ] and k  kLp is the usual Lp-norm for p= 1 or p= ¥.
There are two essential cases of sequences us for which the above require-
ments are satisfied:
Case 1: L1(-simple needle)-variation, where
us (t;q) =

v if (t;q) 2 [t ;t+ps ] [k;k+ps ];
u(t;q) elsewhere
and t 2 [0;T ), k 2 [0; Q¯) and v 2U are arbitrarily fixed.
Case 2: L¥-variation, where
us = u+sv
and v 2 L¥(D) is such that us (t;q) 2U for all sufficiently small s .
Using assumptions (i), (ii), (iii) and (v) it can be easily verified that in both
cases requirements (2.8) and (2.9) are fulfilled.
Let us denote by J(v) the value of the objective function (2.1) correspond-
ing to v 2 U . By a similar analysis as in the usual proof of the Pontryagin
maximum principle for ODE control systems with unconstrained state we ob-
tain the following result. For every function l : D 7! Rn which is absolutely
continuous in t for a.e. q 2 [0; Q¯], with l˙ 2 L¥(D) and l (T;q) = 0, for ev-
ery absolutely continuous function m : [0;T ] 7!R satisfying m(T ) = 0, and for
every n 2 L¥(0;T ) the following variational representation holds (the proof is
not straightforward and will be presented in Appendix):
DJ =
Z T
0
Z Q(t)
0
[Lx+ l˙ +l fx]Dxdqdt
+
Z T
0

m˙+mgQ+
Z Q(t)
0
(LQ+l fQ)dq
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+
1
DQ(t)
Z Qs (t)
Q(t)
[L+l ( f   x˙b)+nh]dq

DQ(t)dt
+
Z T
0

 n+mgy+
Z Q(t)
0
(Ly+l fy)dq

Dydt
+
Z T
0
Z Q(t)
0
[DuL+lDu f +nDuh]dqdt+o(s): (2.10)
In the case DQ(t) = 0 the term 1DQ(t)
R Qs (t)
Q(t) may be defined as any real num-
ber. Here the arguments (t;q;x(t;q);Q(t);y(t);u(t;q)) are skipped, DuL =
L(us (t;q)) L (similarly for the other terms Du : : :), and as usual o(s)=s ! 0.
This notational convention will be systematically used below: the arguments
of the functions will appear only if they are different from those mentioned
above, or in order to avoid confusion, or for more clarity.
Let l be defined as the solution of the adjoint equation
 l˙ (t;q) = Lx(t;q)+l (t;q) fx(t;q); l (T;q) = 0: (2.11)
Then the first term in the right-hand side of (2.10) disappears. This equation
has a unique solution on [0;T ] in a similar sense as (2.4): for every q 2 [0; Q¯]
it is a linear ODE with end condition l (T;q) = 0. Clearly, l˙ 2 L¥(D), as
required.
Given the control u 2U and the corresponding solution of (2.2)–(2.4) and
adjoint function l , let us define for t 2 [0;T ] and m 2 R the set
G(t;m) = Limsup
a!0;a 6=0
1
a
Z Q(t)+a
Q(t)

L(t;q)+l (t;q)( f (t;q)  x˙b(t))
+ (mgy(t)+h(t))h(t;q)

dq; (2.12)
where
h(t) =
Z Q(t)
0
(Ly(t;q)+l (t;q) fy(t;q))dq (2.13)
and Limsup
a!0;a 6=0
G(a) is the Kuratowski upper limit of a function G at a = 0,
consisting of all condensation points of sequences G(ak) with ak ! 0, ak 6= 0.
Thanks to the continuity of the right-hand side in (2.12) with respect to a > 0
it is easy to prove that G(t;m) is a compact interval. For the same reason it
is easy to prove that G : [0;T ]R) R is measurable in t and Lipschitz in m
(theorems 8.2.8 and 8.2.5 in (Aubin & Frankowska, 1990) are used in the proof
of the measurability). The Lipschitz continuity holds due to kgy hkL¥(D) < ¥,
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which is a Lipschitz constant of G with respect to m . Then the differential
inclusion
 m˙(t) 2 m(t)gQ(t)+x (t)+G(t;m(t)); m(T ) = 0 (2.14)
with
x (t) :=
Z Q(t)
0
[LQ(t;q)+l (t;q) fQ(t;q)]dq (2.15)
has at least one solution (see e.g. (Aubin, 1991, Theorem 11.7.1)), therefore
its reachable set R(t) is nonempty for every t 2 [0;T ].
Let us define the measurable functions
ss (t) =

1 if Qs (t) = Q(t);
0 if Qs (t) 6= Q(t);
and
ds (t) = DQ(t)+s2ss (t):
Now consider the equation
  ˙˜ms (t) = m˜s (t)gQ(t)+x (t)
+
1
ds (t)
Z Q(t)+ds (t)
Q(t)
[L+l ( f   x˙b(t))+(m˜s (t)gy(t)+h(t))h]dq;
m˜s (T ) = 0: (2.16)
Notice that ds (t) 6= 0 for any s > 0 and t. Since the right-hand side of (2.16)
is linear in m˜s uniformly in t and measurable in t, it has a solution m˜s (t). Then
denoting
n˜s (t) = m˜s (t)gy(t)+h(t) (2.17)
and inserting l ; m˜s ; n˜s in (2.10) we obtain
DJ =
Z T
0
Z Q(t)
0
[DuL+lDu f + n˜sDuh]dqdt+o(s): (2.18)
We have
dist

1
ds (t)
Z Q(t)+ds (t)
Q(t)
[L+l ( f   x˙b(t))+(m˜s (t)gy(t)+h(t))h]dq;
G(t; m˜s (t))

:= bs (t)  !
s!0
0
for every t, where bs is bounded in s and t. This easily follows from the con-
tinuity with respect to m of the mappings involved, the uniform boundedness
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of m˜s and the definition of G. By the Filippov theorem (Aubin & Frankowska,
1990, Theorem 10.4.1) we obtain that there exists a solution ms (t) of (2.14)
such that
jms (t)  m˜s (t)j C
Z T
0
bs (t)dt  !
s!0
0:
Then using (2.8), (2.17), (2.18), and the Lipschitz continuity of h with respect
to u (cf. Standing Assumption (ii)) we obtain that
DJ =
Z T
0
Z Q(t)
0
[DuL+lDu f +nsDuh]dqdt+o(s); (2.19)
where
ns (t) = ms (t)gy(t)+h(t): (2.20)
Let us summarize what we have obtained so far.
Proposition 1 Let u 2 U be arbitrarily fixed and let us 2 U be a sequence
of controls satisfying (2.8), (2.9). Then equation (2.19) holds true with the
adjoint function l 2 L¥(D) defined in (2.11) and some solution ms of (2.14)
and the corresponding ns defined by (2.20). Here l and ms are absolutely
continuous in t with l˙ 2 L¥(D), m˙s 2 L¥[0;T ], h and x are defined by (2.13)
and (2.15), respectively.
We shall make use of the above finding in two ways. First, in this section,
we shall consider the needle variation defined in Case 1 in order to obtain a
specific global maximum principle for the problem in consideration, then in
Section 2.4 we shall use variations as in Case 2 to express the derivative of
the objective functional with respect to the control under additional conditions
that ensure its existence.
Define H˜ : DRn+1+m+r+n+m 7! R as
H˜(t;q;x;Q;y;u;l ;n) = L(t;q;x;Q;y;u)+l f (t;q;x;Q;y;u)+n h(t;q;u):
Theorem 1 Let u 2 L¥(D) be an optimal control in the problem (2.1)–(2.5)
and let z := (x;Q;y) be the corresponding trajectory. Let l be the solution
of the adjoint equation (2.11) (it exists and is unique on D) and let h , x and
G be defined by (2.13), (2.15) and (2.12), respectively. Then the reachable
set R(t) of the differential inclusion (2.14) is nonempty, and for almost every
(t;q) 2 D(u) := f(t;q) : t 2 [0;T ); q 2 [0;Q(t))g
max
v
min
n
 
H˜(t;q;z(t;q);v;l (t;q);n)  H˜(t;q;z(t;q);u(t;q);l (t;q);n) 0;
(2.21)
subject to v 2U and n 2 R(t)gy(t)+h(t).
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Proof We shall sketch the proof emphasizing only the points that are unusual.
Assume that the claim of the theorem is not true. Denote by j(t;q;v) the
function “min : : :” in (2.21). This function is measurable in (t;q), according
to (Aubin & Frankowska, 1990, Theorem 8.2.11). In a routine way we obtain
that there exists a set W  D(u) with positive measure, e > 0 and v 2U such
that j(t;q;v) e for (t;q) 2W. Let (t;k) be a Lebesgue point of W, that is,
meas(W\Bs ) = s +o(s); (2.22)
where Bs is the box [t ;t +
p
s ] [k;k +ps ]. Let us be the simple needle
control variation defined in Case 1, and let (l ;ms ;ns ) be the functions from
Proposition 1. Then according to (2.19)
DJ =
Z
Bs
[H˜(t;q;v;ns (t))  H˜(t;q;ns (t))]dqdt+o(s);
where, consistently with our notational convention:
H˜(t;q;v;n) = H˜(t;q;z(t;q);v;l (t;q);n);
H˜(t;q;n) = H˜(t;q;z(t;q);u(t;q);l (t;q);n):
Then taking into account that ns (t) 2 R(t)gy(t) + h(t) we obtain from the
inequality j(t;q;v) e and (2.22) that
DJ 
Z
Bs\W
e d(q; t)+
Z
BsnW
: : : d(q; t)+o(s) = es +o(s):
Since for sufficiently small s > 0 the right-hand side is strictly positive we
come to a contradiction. 
The above theorem gives information about the optimal control only for
q 2 [0;Q(t)]. Obviously the values of u for q > Q(t) are irrelevant for the
objective value.
In the applications we have in mind the optimal control is regular enough
to reduce the inclusion in (2.14) to an equation. Below we elaborate on this
case, starting with
Assumption (vii): The functions L, Lx, f , fx and h are continuous with
respect to q (uniformly in the rest of the variables); the optimal control u is
(equivalent to) a function which is continuous from the left with respect to q at
q= Q(t) for a.e. t 2 [0;T ].
Since, as just mentioned, the values of u for q> Q(t) are irrelevant for the
objective function (2.1), we may redefine the optimal u as u(t;q) = u(t;Q(t))
for q > Q(t). Moreover, because of assumption (vii), the functions x(t; ) and
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l (t; ) are continuous in q at q = Q(t), thus x(t;Q(t)) and l (t;Q(t)) are well
defined. Then the set G(t;m) is a singleton:
G(t;m)= L(t;Q(t))+l (t;Q(t))( f (t;Q(t))  x˙b(t))+(mgy(t)+h(t))h(t;Q(t))
and (2.14) becomes an equation. Let m() be its solution and n() be obtained
from m() by (2.20). Then m() and n() solve the equations
 m˙(t) = m(t)gQ(t)+L(t;Q(t))
+l (t;Q(t))( f (t;Q(t))  x˙b(t))+n(t)h(t;Q(t))
+
Z Q(t)
0
[LQ(t;q)+l (t;q) fQ(t;q)]dq; m(T ) = 0; (2.23)
n(t) = m(t)gy(t)+
Z Q(t)
0
[Ly(t;q)+l (t;q) fy(t;q)]dq: (2.24)
Notice that according to the notational convention and the side condition x(t;Q(t))=
xb(t) we have L(t;Q(t)) = L(t;Q(t);xb(t);Q(t);y(t);u(t;Q(t))) and similarly
for the other functions above.
Now we introduce the function (having in many respects the traditional
meaning of “hamiltonian”) H : DRn+1+m+r+n+1+m 7! R as
H(t;q;x;Q;y;u;l ;m;n) = L(t;q;x;Q;y;u)+l f (t;q;x;Q;y;u)
+m g(t;Q;y)+n h(t;q;u)
where the arguments in the left-hand side should be inserted in the right-hand
side wherever appropriate. Then Theorem 1 implies that there exists a unique
solution of adjoint equations, as states in the following theorem.
Theorem 2 Under assumptions (i) – (vii) denote by u 2 L¥(D) an optimal
control in the problem (2.1)–(2.5) and by z := (x;Q;y) the corresponding tra-
jectory. Then the adjoint system (2.11), (2.23)–(2.24) has a unique solution
p := (l ;m;n) and for a.e. t 2 [0;T ] and a.e. q 2 [0;Q(t)]
H(t;q;z(t;q);u(t;q);p(t;q)) =max
u2U
H(t;q;z(t;q);u;p(t;q)):
In the next section, we elaborate on numerical procedure of finding an
optimal control.
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2.4 A numerical approach
We include this section in the chapter for the following reason. It turns out (as
shown in the next section by two examples) that the objective functional J(u)
is not differentiable in u 2 L¥(D), in general. Even more intriguing, although
the value of J(u) does not depend on the values of u(t;q) for q > Q[u](t),
the differentiability property may depend on how u(t;q) is defined above the
graph of Q. This fact requires a special analysis which is the main point in this
section.
For solving numerically problem (2.1)–(2.5) we apply a version of the gra-
dient projection method in the control space L¥(D). Denoting as before by
J(u) the objective value corresponding to control u 2U , the gradient projec-
tion method consists of the following. Denote by J0(u) the derivative of J with
respect to u in L¥(D) (if it exists). Given the current “approximation” uk 2U
of the optimal control, assume that J0(uk) can be represented by a function
from L¥(D) (this will be proved in Theorem 3 below, see equation (2.25)). We
find a next approximation uk+1 as
uk+1 =PU (uk+akJ0(uk)):
wherePX means the metric projection on X . Clearly
uk+1(t;q) =PU
 
uk(t;q)+akJ0(uk)(t;q)

:
The choice of the parameter ak  0 is a subject of many publications on gra-
dient methods and it is beyond the scope of current discussion.
Denote by Ulc the set of those u 2 U that are continuous from the left
at q = Q[u](t) for a.e. t 2 [0;T ] and by Uc the set of those u 2 U that are
continuous at Q[u](t) for a.e. t 2 [0;T ]. First of all, in addition to assumptions
(i)–(vii) we introduce the following one.
Assumption (viii). The functions L, f , h are continuously differentiable
with respect to u, uniformly with respect to the rest of the variables.
Theorem 3 Under assumptions (i)–(viii) the objective function J(u) is
Gateaux-differentiable at every u 2Uc and the derivative J0(u) can be repre-
sented by the function
J0(u) =

Hu(t;q), if q Q(t);
0 , if q> Q(t);
(2.25)
where (l ;m;n) is the solution of the adjoint system (2.11), (2.23)–(2.24).
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Proof Let us be defined as in Case 2: us = u+sv, in Section 2.3, where
v 2 L¥(D). Then from (2.19) and the fact that now ns does not depend on s
we obtain
DJ =
Z T
0
Z Q(t)
0
[H(t;q;u(t;q)+sv(t;q)) H(t;q;u(t;q))]dqdt+o(s)
= s
Z T
0
Z Q(t)
0
Hu(t;q)v(t;q)dqdt+o(s);
due to the uniform continuous differentiability of H in u, which means that the
functional J is Gateaux differentiable at u in the space L¥(D) and its derivative
is (represented by) (2.25). 
In order to ensure that J0(u) stays continuous from the left, we shall mod-
ify the gradient projection procedure in such a way that uk 2 Uc. Indeed,
assume that uk 2 Uc. Then it is easy to verify (using the continuous de-
pendence of the solution of an ODE on parameters) that Hu is also contin-
uous in q at q = Q(t) for a.e. t. Then J0(u) is continuous from the left at
q = Q(t) due to (2.25). Since PU is a continuous mapping, we obtain that
u˜k+1(t;q) :=PU (uk(t;q)+akJ0(uk)(t;q)) has the same property. Define the
operator I :Ulc !Uc as
I (u)(t;q) =

u(t;q) , for q Q[u](t);
u(t;Q[u](t)) , for q> Q[u](t):
Notice that J(I (u)) = J(u), but J is differentiable at I (u), while it need not
be differentiable at u. Then we define the next iteration as
uk+1(t;q) =I
 
PU
 
uk(t;q)+akJ0(uk)(t;q)

:
The numerical implementation involves discretization with respect to t and
qwhich contains delicate technical points due to the changing domain [0;Q(t)].
The author wrote in MATLAB a program tackling these points, using adaptive
discretization with respect to q. The detailed description of the program is
outside the scope of the present study. Some results of calculations by the
program are presented in Section 2.6 for an economic example.
2.5 Two examples of non-differentiability of the objec-
tive function
As mentioned in the previous section the objective value J(u) in (2.1) consid-
ered as a function of the control could be non-differentiable in the space L¥(D).
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We distinguish two different cases of non-differentiability: one is harmless,
while the other is not and requires the non-standard form of the maximum
principle considered in the previous section.
1. Let u 2 U and let Q(t) = Q[u](t) be the corresponding solution of
(2.2), (2.3). As argued in Section 2.2, the respective solution (x[u];Q[u];y[u])
is independent of the values of u for q> Q(t), and if u is continuous from the
left with respect to q at q= Q(t) for a.e. t, then u can be redefined to become
continuous in q for q = Q(t), e.g. as u(t;q) = u(t;Q(t)) for q > Q(t) (we use
the notation u# for the redefined control). Then J is Gateaux differentiable at
u#. This is the “harmless” case of possible non-differentiability of J(u), which
can be avoided by the redefinition of u for q> Q(t).
Although the objective value J(u) does not depend on the values of u for
q> Q(t), its differentiability does, and requires that u be continuous in q also
from the right at q = Q(t) (which means that the redefinition of u as u# is
essential). The example below shows this.
Example 1. Consider the system
Q˙(t) = y(t); Q(0) = 1:
y(t) =
Z Q(t)
0
u(t;q)dq
and the functional
J(u) =
Z 1
0
Z Q(t)
0
1dqdt =
Z 1
0
Q(t)dt:
This is not interpreted as an optimal control problem. We just study the
differentiability of the functional J, defined for u 2 L¥([0;1] [0;¥)).
Fix the control
u(t;q) =

1, if q 2 [0;et ];
a, if q> et ;
where a is a real number. Then consider the controls uh1(t;q) = u(t;q)  h
and uh2(t;q) = u(t;q)+h, h> 0, and the corresponding solutions (Q
h
i ;y
h
i ), and
compare with the solution for u, which is obviously Q(t) = et . It can also be
directly checked that for h close to zero we have
Qh1(t) = e
(1 h)t = Q(t) htet +O(h2):
The function F(t;Q) =
R Q
0 u(t;q)dq is Lipschitz in Q and measurable in t, and
Q(t) and Qh2(t) satisfy the equations
Q˙(t) = F(t;Q(t)); Q˙h2(t) = F(t;Q
h
2(t))+hQ
h
2(t); Q(0) = Q
h
2(0) = 1:
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By a standard comparison argument (or as a consequence of the viability the-
ory, (Aubin, 1991, Chapter 11)) this implies Qh2(t) Q(t). Hence
yh2(t) =
Z Q(t)
0
uh2(t;q)dq+
Z Qh2(t)
Q(t)
uh2(t;q)dq
= (1+h)Q(t)+(a+h)(Qh2(t) Q(t))
= (a+h)Qh2(t)+(1 a)Q(t):
Then the equation for Qh2 becomes
Q˙h2(t) = (a+h)Q
h
2(t)+(1 a)Q(t); Qh2(0) = 1:
Using the Cauchy formula we obtain after routine calculations that
Qh2(t) = e
t

1+
h
1 a h

  h
1 a h e
(a+h)t
= Q(t)+
h
1 a h
 
et   eat  h
1 a hhte
at +O(h2):
Now we consider the case a 6= 1 (hence u is discontinuous from the right).
Then the second last term in the above equality is also O(h2), thus for h close
to zero we have
Qh2(t) = Q(t)+
h
1 a
 
et   eat+O(h2):
Then
J(u h)  J(u) = h
Z 1
0
tet dt+O(h2);
while
J(u+h)  J(u) = h
1 a
Z 1
0
 
et   eat dt+O(h2):
The last two equalities show that J is not differentiable if a 6= 1.
In contrast, if a= 1 the objective J is differentiable in the direction 1 (as
it was proved in the previous section) since in this case
Qh2(t) = Q(t)+hte
t +O(h2):
The above example shows, in particular, that the special attention that we
attribute to the definition of u above Q[u](t) in the previous section is essential.
2. Below we give another example, which shows that the “remedy” of
redefinition of u above Q(t) in order to get differentiability of J(u) is not ap-
plicable if u is too “bad” below Q(t). This example justifies the non-standard
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form of the maximum principle in the case of an optimal control that is not
continuous from the left at Q(t).
Example 2. Consider the system
Q˙(t) = y(t); Q(0) = 1; t 2 [0;1] (2.26)
y(t) =
Z Q(t)
0
u(t;q)dq; (2.27)
and the functional
J(u) =
Z 1
0
Z Q(t)
0
u(t;q)dqdt:
As in Example 1, this is not interpreted as an optimal control problem. We
just study the differentiability of the functional J, defined for u 2 L¥([0;1]
[0;¥)). We shall prove that for some u the functional J is not even directionally
differentiable at u in the direction of
w(t;q) =

0 for (t;q) 2 [0; t¯] [0;¥)
 1 for (t;q) 2 (t¯;1] [0;¥);
where t¯ 2 (0;1) is to be chosen later sufficiently close to 1. Namely, we define
u(t;q) u(q) =

v(1 q) for q 2 [0;1)
0 for q 1
where v(q) is defined on (0;1] as v(1) = 1 and
v(q) =

1 for q 2  13k ; 23k  k = 1; 2; : : : ;
 1 for q 2  23k ; 33k  k = 1; 2; : : : :
The solution of (2.26), (2.27) for u is Q(t) = 1, y(t) = 0, since
y(t) =
Z 1
0
v(1 q)dq=
Z 1
0
v(q)dq= 0:
Now, let us = u+sw, where s is a “small” positive real number. Denote
by Qs and ys the corresponding solution of (2.26), (2.27). It is clear that
us (t;q) u(t;q) on [0; t¯] [0;¥) and, hence, Qs (t) Q(t) 1 on [0; t¯]. Is is
also clear that Qs (t) Q(t) for t 2 [t¯;1].
Denoting V (q) =
Z q
0
v(s)ds for q 2 ( ¥;¥), we have 0  V (q)  12q for
q 2 [0;1] and also V   33k = 0 and V   23k = 12  23k for k = 1;2;3; ::: .
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For t 2 [t¯;1] we have Q˙s (t) =
Z Qs (t)
0
[u(q) s ]dq= s +
Z Qs (t)
1
[u(q) 
s ]dq.
Defining js (t) := Qs (t)  (1 s(t  t¯)) for t 2 [t¯;1], we have js (t¯) = 0 and
j˙s (t) =
Z 1 s(t t¯)+js (t)
1
[u(q) s ]dq
=  
Z s(t t¯) js (t)
0
[v(s) s ]ds
=  V [s(t  t¯) js (t)]+s [s(t  t¯) js (t)]:
Case 1. Assume js (t)> 0 for t 2 [t0; t] [t¯;1] where js (t0) = 0. Then
0< js (t)
Z t
t0
s2(m  t¯)dm  1
2
s2(t  t¯)2 =O(s2) for t 2 [t0; t]; (2.28)
i.e.
Qs (t) = 1 s(t  t¯)+O(s2) for t 2 [t0; t]: (2.29)
Case 2. Assume js (t)< 0 for t 2 [t0; t] [t¯;1] where js (t0) = 0. Then
V (q) 1
2
q
and
js (t) =
Z t
t0
[ V (s(m  t¯) js (m))+s(s(m  t¯) js (m))]dm
yield
0< js (t)

1
2
s  s2

1
2
(t  t¯)2+
Z t
t0
( js (m))dm:
Applying the Gronwall inequality (cf., e.g., (Corduneanu, 1971), p. 14) we
obtain
0< js (t)

1
2
s  s2

1
2
(t  t¯)2et t0  1
4
s(t  t¯)2e1 t¯ for t 2 [t0; t]:
This implies
Qs (t) 1 s(t  t¯)  1
4
s(t  t¯)2e1 t¯ for t 2 [t0; t]: (2.30)
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We have
J(us )  J(u) =
Z 1
0
Z Qs (t)
0
[u(q)+sw(t;q)]dqdt 
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
u(q)dqdt
=  s(1  t¯) 
Z 1
t¯
Z 1
1 s(t t¯)
u(q)dqdt
+
Z 1
t¯
Z Qs (t)
1 s(t t¯)
u(q)dqdt+
Z 1
t¯
Z 1
Qs (t)
s dqdt:
From (2.29) and (2.30) we obtain that the last term above is O(s2). We
next estimate the third term in the last row above. From (2.28) and (2.30) we
obtain that if the positive s is small enough,
jQs (t)  [1 s(t  t¯)]j  e
1 t¯
4
(t  t¯)2 s holds true for every t 2 [1  t¯;1]:
Hence,Z 1
t¯
Z Qs (t)
1 s(t t¯)
u(q)dqdt
 s e1 t¯4
Z 1
t¯
(t  t¯)2 dt = s e
1 t¯
12
(1  t¯)3: (2.31)
We thus obtained that
J(us )  J(u) = s(1  t¯) Zs +Ys +O(s2):
where
Zs =
1Z
t¯
1Z
1 s(t t¯)
u(q)dqdt and Ys =
1Z
t¯
Qs (t)Z
1 s(t t¯)
u(q)dqdt:
In order to prove non-differentiability of J at u in the direction of w it is
enough to show that (Zs  Ys )=s does not converge with s ! 0. We have
Zs
s
=
1
s
1Z
t¯
1Z
1 s(t t¯)
v(1 q)dqdt = 1
s
1Z
t¯
s(t t¯)Z
0
v(q)dqdt
=
(1  t¯)2
s(1  t¯)
s(1 t¯)Z
0
v(q)dq  (1  t¯)
2
(s(1  t¯))2
s(1 t¯)Z
0
qv(q)dq: (2.32)
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We shall consider the last two integrals separately, for values s 0k =
2=3k
1  t¯ and
s 00k =
3=3k
1  t¯ of k = 1; 2; : : : . Easy calculations give for the first integral in
(2.32)
1
s 0k(1  t¯)
s 0k(1 t¯)Z
0
v(q)dq  1
s 00k (1  t¯)
s 00k (1 t¯)Z
0
v(q)dq=
1
2
 0= 1
2
:
More cumbersome calculations, which we skip, give for the second integral in
(2.32)
1
(s 0k(1  t¯))2
s 0k(1 t¯)Z
0
qv(q)dq  1
(s 00k (1  t¯))2
s 00k (1 t¯)Z
0
qv(q)dq=
11
32
+
1
8
=
15
32
:
Comparing the expressions for the two integrals in (2.32) we conclude that the
variation of Z
s
s remains strictly positive (at least (1  t¯)2=32) for arbitrarily
small s . On the other hand, from (2.31) we obtain that if t¯ 2 (0;1) is close
enough to 1, jY
s j
s  (1  t¯)2=64 holds true. Hence (Zs  Ys )=s does not
converge with s ! 0. This completes the proof of the non-differentiability of
J at u in the direction w.
The example, discussed above, can be easily modified to include the case
of strictly increasing Q() by replacing the equation in (2.26) by Q˙(t) = 1+
y(t). Since the proof of the non-differentiability of J in this case requires longer
and more cumbersome calculations, we omit it.
2.6 An economic example
In this section we present a stylized economic model of endogenous economic
growth to which the above results can be applied. This economic model is
a particular case of a model considered in (Skritek et al., 2014), for which
regularity condition for the optimal control is fulfilled.
We consider a finite time horizon [0;T ] (presumably rather large, so that
T is an “approximation” of the infinity) and a large corporation producing
at time t diverse goods labeled by the real number q 2 [0;Q(t)]. Here Q(t)
is the newest good (technology) available at time t. Each of the goods q is
produced by a separate firm that at time t has physical capital stock x(t;q).
The q-th firm (q 2 [0;Q(t)]) invests at time t an amount u(t;q) that is split
in two parts: au(t;q), 0  a  1, is allocated to increase the capital stock,
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while (1 a)u(t;q) is the contribution of the q-th firm to the R&D activity of
the corporation which results in development of new technologies (goods) and
hence in increase of Q(t).
The model reads as follows:
x˙(t;q) =  dx(t;q)+au(t;q); x(0;q) = x0(q) for q 2 [0;Q0];
x(t;Q(t)) = 0 for t > 0;
Q˙(t) = (1 a)y(t); Q(0) = Q0;
y(t) =
Z Q(t)
0
u(t;q)dq:
Here y(t) is the total investment in R&D, d  0 is the depreciation rate of
the physical capital, x0(q) is the initially available capital stock for producing
goods q 2 [0;Q0], Q0 > 0 is the newest technology available at time t = 0. For
all technologies obtained at t > 0, initial capital stock is assumed to be zero,
x(t;Q(t)) = 0. The objective function to be maximized isZ T
0
e rt
Z Q(t)
0

p(q;Q(t))x(t;q) bu(t;q)  cu2(t;q) dqdt; (2.33)
subject to the control constraints u(t;q) 0 and u(t;q) 1. In the model r 0
is the discount rate, p(q;Q) is the market price of the good q2 [0;Q], given that
goods up to levelQ are available, bu+cu2, b 0, c> 0, is the quadratic cost of
investments u. The dependence of the price p on q and Q reflects the fact that
the market price of any available good decreases when newer products emerge
(that is, when Q increases). For the present illustrative purpose we chose the
specification
p(q;Q) = e g(Q q)
with g  0. So the price of the newest product is normalized to one (which
is supported by the data for personal computers and mobile telephones, where
the price of the new products does not substantially change with time, while
the quality increases).
Because the integrand of the objective functional (2.33) is strictly concave
in u, one may expect that optimal control would be always bounded even with-
out the upper constraint u(t;q) 1. We will give an example, where this is not
the case. The reason is that the upper limit Q(t) of the integral also depends
on u, and at particular parameters the unique optimal solution hits the upper
bound for sufficiently high time horizon T , see Figure 2.3.
Let us write optimality conditions. As proved in (Skritek et al., 2014),
there exists a unique optimal control u(t;q) that is continuous from the left at
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q=Q[u](t). Adjoint equations (2.11), (2.23)-(2.24) for this example, written in
the terms of the “current value” adjoint variables l˜ = ertl , m˜ = ertm , n˜ = ertn
read as follows
  ˙˜l (t;q) =  (d + r)l˜ (t;q)+ e g(Q(t) q); l˜ (T;q) = 0; (2.34)
  ˙˜m(t) =  rm˜(t)  [bu(t;Q(t))+ cu2(t;Q(t))]
+al˜ (t;Q(t))u(t;Q(t))+ n˜(t)u(t;Q(t))
 g
Z Q(t)
0
e g(Q(t) q)x(t;q)dq; m˜(T ) = 0; (2.35)
n˜(t) = m˜(t)(1 a); (2.36)
and Theorem 2 implies that
u(t;q) =min
(
1;max
(
0;
al˜ (t;q)+ n˜(t) b
2c
))
: (2.37)
In the following we solve the optimal control problem for different param-
eter sets. In simple cases we obtain exact analytic solutions, in more compli-
cated cases we derive asymptotic solutions and resort to numerics, as described
in Section 2.4.
1. Let us consider first the case g = 0, where the solution can be studied
analytically. It follows from (2.37) and (2.34) that the optimal control does
not depend on q, so l˜ (t;q) = l˜ (t) and u(t;q) = u(t). We will solve equa-
tions (2.34)–(2.37) backwards starting from time T . It follows from m˜(T ) = 0,
l˜ (T ) = 0, and (2.37) that u(T ) = 0. Let [t0;T ] be the maximal interval which
ends at T and in which u(t) = 0. To find t0 we substitute u(t) = 0 in (2.35) and
obtain (using that g = 0) the solution m˜(t) = n˜(t) = 0 for t 2 [t0;T ]. Now we
get from (2.37) that l˜ (t0) = b=a and substitute here the solution
l˜ (t) =
1  e (r+d )(T t)
r+d
of equation (2.34). Thus, we obtain
t0 = T +
1
d + r
ln

1 b d + r
a

; when b
d + r
a
< 1:
It the case b(d + r)=a  1 the optimal control is identically zero.
In a time interval, where the control constraint is not active (u(t) > 0) the
derivative of the hamiltonian must be equal to zero:
H˜u(t;q) = b 2cu(t;q)+al˜ (t;q)+ n˜(t) = 0:
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Figure 2.2: Optimal investments for g = 0, d = 0, r = 0:3, T = 50, b = 0:4,
c= 3, a = 0:5, A> 0.
Using this condition and equations (2.34)–(2.36) we can derive the following
Riccati equation for the optimal control for t 2 [0; t0]
u˙(t) = ru(t)  1 a
2
u(t)2  r
2c

a
d + r
 b

  ad
2c(d + r)
e (d+r)(T t);
u(t0) = 0; (2.38)
which turns out to be positive on [0; t0). Notice, that if solution u(t) reaches
the upper bound, u(t1) = 1, at first time instance t1 > 0 to the left from t0, then
optimal control u(t) = 1 for all t 2 [0; t1).
1.1. The solution of equation (2.38) can be obtained in special functions.
Under the additional condition d = 0 it takes the simpler form
u(t) =
r
1 a  
p
A
c(1 a) tanh
 p
A
2c
(t0  t)+ arctanh

r cp
A
!
;
see Figure 2.2, if
A := c
 
r2c  (1 a)(a br)> 0:
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Figure 2.3: Optimal investments hit its upper bound, for g = 0, d = 0, r = 0:1,
T = 50, b= 0:4, c= 3, a = 0:5, A< 0.
If A< 0 the solution is
u(t) =
r
1 a +
p A
c(1 a) tan
p A
2c
(t0  t)  arctan

r cp A

;
which tends to infinity, if t0  t may take sufficiently large values when t 2
[0; t0]. This is always the case if T is sufficiently large, as it follows from
the expression for t0. Then the optimal control certainly hits its upper bound,
u(t) = 1 for t 2 [0; t1), see Figure 2.3.
Thus, in order to ensure boundedness of the solution on any time hori-
zon even without upper control constraint, like in Figure 2.2, the discount rate
should be big enough:
r >
1
2c
q
b2(1 a)2+4ca (1 a) b(1 a)

: (2.39)
1.2. In the case d > 0 we apply an asymptotic analysis assuming that T is
large. Namely, we can find the asymptotic solution of (2.38) considering times
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t such that t0  t is big enough for neglecting the last term in (2.38). Then the
two steady state solutions are
u1 =
p
r
1 a
"
p
r+
s
r  1 a
c

a
d + r
 b
#
;
u2 =
p
r
1 a
"
p
r 
s
r  1 a
c

a
d + r
 b
# : (2.40)
The first of which is an attractor while the second is a repeller. In inverse time
t 0 =  t point u2 becomes an attractor with the basin of attraction (u1; ¥).
Thus, u2 is the horizontal asymptote of the exact solution for t !  ¥ if it
is still in the basin u(t) 2 (u1; ¥) when the last term in (2.38) is already
insignificant, see Figure 2.4 (top). For a large time horizon [0;T ] if the optimal
control u(t) exists then most of the time t 2 [0; t0] it is close to u2 when u2 > 0,
or u(t)  0 when u2  0. Nonnegativity of the expression under the square
root in (2.40) gives us condition for existence of asymptote u2
r >
1
2c
q
(b(1 a) d c)2+4ca (1 a) b(1 a) d c

(2.41)
that generalizes condition (2.39) to all d  0. It follows from (2.40) and (2.41)
that when d > a=b even r = 0 allows for bounded solution but this solution is
trivial u(t;q) 0.
The essence of the above analysis is that even for a very simple economic
problem the issue of existence of a solution is not simple. To ensure existence
we introduce here upper constraint u(t)  1, that has not much of economic
sense. While inequality (2.41) provides a necessary condition under which a
solution exists for any time horizon [0;T ] without upper constraint.
2. The above considerations concern the “degenerate” case g = 0, where
all data of the problem are independent of q. In the general case g  0 we have
obtained only numerical results.2
Figure 2.5 presents the optimal investments (top) and the corresponding
capital stock (bottom) of the firm with g = 0:7. The time horizon is T = 50 and
the initial product variety is [0;Q0] = [0;1]. Notice that due to the technological
development (Q(t) increases from 1 to about 2) the firm completely abandons
investments in some older technologies. At time t = 30, for example, the firm
invests only in technologies q 2 [0:6;1:63]. As a result, the physical capital
2 The numerical results are obtained by our own MATLAB solver in which the modification
of the gradient projection method described in Section 2.4 is implemented.
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of technologies q much smaller than the technological frontier Q(t) is close to
zero.3 Every section x(;q) has the meaning of diffusion curve of technology
q. It starts at the time q(q) (see (2.6)) and reaches its maximum at some later
time, after which it begins decreasing.
3. In the above numerical example the dependence of the optimal con-
trol on the technology q results from the dependence of the price function
p(q;Q) on q. However, a minor nonlinearity inserted in the problem may
lead to technology-dependent investments even if all data of the problem are
technology-independent. Let, for example, the revenue function p(q;Q)x in
(2.33) be replaced with p(x+ xm)s with s 2 (0;1) and constant p > 0 and
xm > 0. This corresponds to the revenue of a firm with market power or scarce
non-capital production factors. The numerically obtained optimal control is
plotted on Figure 2.6. Clearly, the investments in the newest technologies are
larger than those of the older ones due to the higher marginal productivity of
the technologies with lower capital stock. But the nature of the higher marginal
productivity of new technologies is the nonlinearity of the production function
rather than heterogeneity of market prises.
3A more profound investigation of the issue of obsolescence in the spirit of (Boucekkine,
Rı´o, & Licandro, 2005) are yet to be done elsewhere.
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Figure 2.4: Optimal investments (top) and the corresponding capital stock
(bottom) for g = 0. Numerical results are compared with asymptotic solution
(dashed lines).
70 Optimal Control of Heterogeneous Systems with Endogenous Domain of Heterogeneity
0
10
20
30
40 0
0.5
1
1.5
2
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
 Q
δ =0.2,  r =0.3,  T =50,  b =0.4,  c =3,  α =0.5,  γ =0.7,  Q0 =1
time  t
co
n
tro
l  
u
0
10
20
30
40 0
0.5
1
1.5
2
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
 Q
δ =0.2,  r =0.3,  T =50,  b =0.4,  c =3,  α =0.5,  γ =0.7,  Q0 =1
time  t
ca
pi
ta
l  
x
Figure 2.5: Optimal investments (top) and the corresponding capital stock
(bottom) for g = 0:7
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Figure 2.6: Optimal investments (top) and the corresponding capital stock
(bottom) for nonlinear production function
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2.7 Conclusion
Optimal control of heterogeneous systems, that is, families of controlled ODEs
parameterized by a parameter running over a growing domain of heterogeneity
is considered. The main novelty, added in this system, is that the domain of
heterogeneity is endogenous: it may depend on the control and on the state
of the system. This extension is crucial for several economic applications and
turns out to rise interesting mathematical problems. A necessary optimality
condition is derived, where one of the adjoint variables satisfies a differential
inclusion (instead of equation) and the maximization of the Hamiltonian takes
the form of “min-max”. As a consequence, a Pontryagin-type maximum prin-
ciple is obtained under certain regularity conditions for the optimal control. A
formula for the derivative of the objective function with respect to the control
from L¥ is presented together with a sufficient condition for its existence. A
stylized economic example of R&D driven economic growth of a corporation
consisting of continuum of firms is given. The economic model is investigated
both analytically and numerically. Sufficient conditions for the optimal solu-
tion being bounded even without upper constraint were derived for homoge-
neous prices. The effect of obsolescence of old technologies is demonstrated
on diffusion curves in the case of heterogeneous prices, when goods of new
design cost more than those of old ones. We also show that a minor nonlinear-
ity inserted in the problem may lead to technology-dependent (heterogeneous)
investments even if all data of the problem are technology-independent.
Appendix
Here we prove the variational representation (2.10) under the conditions of
Section 2.3 and with the notational convention made there. Consider
DJ := J(us )  J(u) =
Z T
0
Z Qs (t)
0
L(t;q;xs (t;q);Qs (t);ys (t);us (t;q))dqdt
 
Z T
0
Z Q(t)
0
L(t;q;x(t;q);Q(t);y(t);u(t;q))dqdt
=
Z T
0
Z Qs (t)
0
[L+LxDx+LQDQ+LyDy+DuL]dqdt
 
Z T
0
Z Q(t)
0
Ldqdt+o(s):
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The same convention is systematically used below. The above equality follows
in a standard way from Assumption (ii) and (2.8), (2.9)4. Using again (2.8) and
(2.9), we obtain
DJ =
Z T
0
Z Qs (t)
Q(t)
Ldqdt+
Z T
0
Z Q(t)
0
[LxDx+LQDQ+LyDy+DuL]dqdt+o(s):
(2.42)
Let l :D 7!Rn be absolutely continuous in t for a.e. q2 [0; Q¯], l˙ 2 L¥(D)
and l (T;q) = 0, q 2 [0; Q¯]. We remind that l is considered as a row-vector.
Consider the valueZ T
0
Z Qs (t)
0
l (t;q)[x˙s (t;q)  x˙b(t)]dqdt
 
Z T
0
Z Q(t)
0
l (t;q)[x˙(t;q)  x˙b(t)]dqdt
=
Z T
0
Z Qs (t)
0
l (t;q)[x˙s (t;q)  x˙b(t;q)]dqdt
 
Z T
0
Z Q(t)
0
l (t;q)[x˙(t;q)  x˙b(t;q)]dqdt
=
Z Qs (T )
0
Z T
qs (q)
l [x˙s   x˙b]dt dq
 
Z Q(T )
0
Z T
q(q)
l [x˙  x˙b]dt dq
=  
Z Qs (T )
0
Z T
qs (q)
l˙ [xs   xb]dt dq
+
Z Q(T )
0
Z T
q(q)
l˙ [x  xb]dt dq;
where we use the side conditions for x, xs and l (see also (2.6) and (2.7)) and
have denoted
qs (q) := q [us ](q) and q(q) := q [u](q). Changing back the order of integra-
tion and denoting
f s (t;q) = f (t;q;xs ;Qs ;ys ;us ) we obtain from the above equalities thatZ T
0
Z Qs (t)
0
l (t;q)[ f s (t;q)  x˙b(t)]dqdt
 
Z T
0
Z Q(t)
0
l (t;q)[ f (t;q)  x˙b(t)]dqdt
4It is to be mentioned that o(s) is not necessarily of second order with respect to s . It can
be of order 3=2.
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=  
Z T
0
Z Qs (t)
0
l˙ (t;q)[xs (t;q)  xb(t;q)]dqdt
+
Z T
0
Z Q(t)
0
l˙ (t;q)[x(t;q)  xb(t;q)]dqdt: (2.43)
In a similar way as for L and using the same notational convention we represent
the left-hand side of (2.43) asZ T
0
Z Q(t)
0
l [ fxDx+ fQDQ+ fyDy+Du f ]dqdt
+
Z T
0
Z Qs (t)
Q(t)
l [ f   x˙b(t)]dqdt+o(s): (2.44)
The right-hand side of (2.43) can be rewritten as
 
Z T
0
Z Q(t)
0
l˙Dxdqdt 
Z T
0
Z Qs (t)
Q(t)
l˙ (t;q)[xs (t;q)  xb(t)]dqdt: (2.45)
Now we shall argue that the second term in the last expression is o(s). We
estimate this term byZ T
0
Z Qs (t)
Q(t)
jxs (t;q)  xb(t)jdq
 dt kl˙kL¥

Z T
0
Z Qs (t)
Q(t)
jxs (t;q)  xs (qs (q);q)jdq
 dt kl˙kL¥
+
Z T
0
Z Qs (t)
Q(t)
jxs (qs (q);q)  xb(qs (q))jdq
 dt kl˙kL¥
+
Z T
0
Z Qs (t)
Q(t)
jxb(qs (q))  xb(t)jdq
 dt kl˙kL¥ : (2.46)
The second term in the right-hand side equals zero due to the definition of x.
Let us consider the first term. Since for a.e. q the function xs (;q) is Lipschitz
with a constant C (independent of q) we haveZ T
0
Z Qs (t)
Q(t)
jxs (t;q)  xs (qs (q);q)jdq
 dt
 C
Z T
0
Z Qs (t)
Q(t)
jt qs (q)jdq
 dt
= C
Z T
0
Z Qs (t)
Q(t)
jqs (Qs (t)) qs (q)jdq
 dt
 C
a0
Z T
0
Z Qs (t)Q(t) jQs (t) qjdq
 dt  C2a0Tc2s2;
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where we have used that qs is Lipschitz continuous with constant 1=a0 and
also (in the last inequality) that kDQkC[0;T ]  cs (cf. (2.8)). The same argu-
ment applies to the last term in (2.46) since xb is Lipschitz.
Thus we obtain from (2.43), (2.44) and (2.45) the equalityZ T
0
Z Q(t)
0
[l˙Dx+l ( fxDx+ fQDQ+ fyDy+Du f )]dqdt
+
Z T
0
Z Qs (t)
Q(t)
l [ f   x˙b(t)]dqdt = o(s); (2.47)
where s is close to zero.
Now we introduce an absolutely continuous function m : [0;T ] 7! R satis-
fying m(T ) = 0. By the same argument that we used in obtaining (2.47) we
obtain the equalityZ T
0
[m(gQDQ+gyDy)+ m˙DQ]dt = o(s); (2.48)
where s is close to zero (note that DQ and Dy depend on s ). As before,
o(s) s3=2.
Finally we introduce an (1m)-dimensional function n 2 L¥(0;T ) and
obtain from (2.3) by the same argument as before that
 
Z T
0
nDydt+
Z T
0
Z Q(t)
0
nDuhdqdt+
Z T
0
Z Qs (t)
Q(t)
nhdqdt = o(s); (2.49)
where s is close to zero. Summing up the equalities (2.42), (2.47), (2.48),
(2.49) we obtain (2.10).

Chapter 3
On the relation of country size
to political system and wealth
inequality
3.1 Introduction
There are few historical examples of territory trade between countries. The
biggest are the purchases by the United States of America of Louisiana (2,147,000
km2 for $15,000,000) from France in 1803 and Alaska (1,717,854 km2 for
$7,200,000) from Russia in 1867. In XX-th century the Treaty of Petro´polis
between Bolivia and Brazil, signed on November 11, 1903 gave Brazil the
territory of Acre (191,000 km2), in exchange for over 3,000 km2 of Brazilian
territory between the Abunaˆ and Madeira rivers, a monetary payment of two
million British pounds, and a pledge of a rail-link between the Bolivian city of
Riberalta and the Brazilian city of Porto Velho.
We study howwealth inequality and the decision making mechanism, adopted
by a country, influence its wellbeing, measured by a social welfare function or
by the amount of resources (e.g. land) accumulated in the country. We also
suggest the condition under which the purchase of the resources (land) hap-
pens voluntarily rather than under military threat. We try to imagine why, for
example, Alexander II, the Emperor of Russia, could have sold Alaska, and
more importantly, why the United States could have bought it.
Indeed, one could argue that usually countries conquer land rather than
buy it. Territorial disputes, that accompany trade, have a higher probability of
going to war than other kinds of disputes, for example policy disputes (see, e.g.
Vasquez & Henehan, 2001). We consider conquest of the territory as a special
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case of trading, when the buyer country pays not to the seller country but to
the third player, a mercenary army, that conquers territory for the buyer, unless
the seller pays to the mercenary at least the same amount to keep its territory.
Which tactics would countries prefer: to fight or to deal? The same dilemma
has been studied (e.g. H. I. Grossman & Mendoza, 2001a, 2001b) in the eco-
nomic theory of empire building using examples of the Roman and other em-
pires, where three strategies where considered: Uncoerced Annexation, Co-
erced Annexation, and Attempted Conquest. In an Uncoerced Annexation the
Romans would compensate the Barbarians sufficiently to induce the Barbar-
ians to agree to the annexation of their country by Rome. In a Coerced Annex-
ation the Romans would induce the Barbarians to agree to the annexation of
their country under the threat that the Romans will attack and try to conquer
the country. In an Attempted Conquest the Romans would attack the Barbarian
country. In contrast with choice-theoretic explanation by Grossman and Men-
doza we tackle this problem with a game-theoretic model, where both players
have the same strategic possibilities, but could have different parameters. We
are to find the condition at which countries would trade their territory rather
than conquer it. We try to correspond the results with terms Uncoerced An-
nexation, Coerced Annexation, and Attempted Conquest.
We study these questions on the example of two neighboring countries
which use their territories as a production factor (capital). So the countries
look like firms competing for a limited resource. Land is deviled between two
states. Private good produced in a country is distributed among its citizens
proportionally to their shares of the state economy. These shares are inherited
from the parents and, in general, not equal. The agents are assumed to be
selfish and consuming all their product before end of their life. Hence, product
is not accumulated though generations. Generations of agents are assumed to
be not overlapping. Thus, each generation starts its life with zero amount of
product, but with inherited heterogeneous distribution of shares in the future
domestic production.
Either country can trade part of its territory for the part of other’s country
production. Countries exchange territory for product, or vice versa, according
to the voting rules corresponding to their forms of government. We model
three forms of government: monarchy (one monarch gets all the product and
makes decisions), oligarchy (citizens vote by their shares of the economy), and
democracy (one citizen – one vote). Notice, that monarchy, in this definition,
is equivalent to the situation when decision can be accepted only unanimously,
i.e. every citizen has veto power. Thus, citizens choose the size of the land to
buy and the amount of country’s product to be given to a group of neighboring
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country’s citizens for their decision to cede the part of their county’s territory.
In the presented study we try to avoid some not very realistic assumptions
such as exogenous income, uniform distribution of the territory among agents,
and free will or full mobility of every agent, when one independently decides
which country to join. It is typical for the literature to use such assumptions
for allocation of public facilities (Cremer, Kerchove, & Thisse, 1985) or for the
similar problem of the equilibrium size and number of nations on the contin-
uum of uniformly distributed individuals (Alesina & Spolaore, 1997), where
each individual at the border between two countries can choose which country
to join with her land. (Alesina & Spolaore, 1997) have also considered the
coalition equilibrium as well as (Bolton & Roland, 1997). Charles M. Tiebout
in his paper (Tiebout, 1956) considered a concept of equilibrium, where the
consumer-voter is fully mobile and will move to one of the fixed number of
communities where her preference pattern is best satisfied. This concept has
been criticized by (Bewley, 1981). He argued that if one tries to generalize
the rigorous version of Tiebout’s theory in a number of interesting directions,
then equilibria may no longer exist or may no longer be Pareto optimal. The
existence proof of “strong Tiebout equilibrium” in (Greenberg &Weber, 1986)
makes use of the notion of “consecutive games” which the authors introduce
and show that for such games there always exists a partition with a nonempty
core. More general research (e.g. Haimanko, Breton, & Weber, 2004) also
needs special assumptions about the structure of the model in order to prove
existence of equilibrium.
Seems that perfect mobility and free will of agents make it difficult to find
an equilibrium, therefore we will refrain from such assumptions. The more so
because there are always some mobility constraints in the real world. That is
why, and also for the sake of simplicity, in the presented model, migration is
not allowed. Notice, that in our model a citizen does not own any particular
piece of land. She receives her share of country’s production, which depends
on country’s territory. These shares do not need to be equal for all citizens.
Thus, we study the problem with heterogeneous wealth distribution among the
agents with endogenous income.
This work elaborates on some early author’s results in (Belyakov, 2007b).
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3.2 Mechanisms of border moving by land trade
We consider two neighboring countries i 2 f1;2g as firms with production
functions fi(Si) depending on the countries territories Si in the following way
fi(Si) 0; d fi(Si)dSi > 0;
d2 fi(Si)
dS2i
< 0 for all Si  0: (3.1)
So functions fi are positive, strictly increasing, strictly concave, and defined
for the positive territory. Each country i is populated with constant number of
citizens Ni > 2 which have their shares q j i of domestic production. Constant
Ni means that no migration is allowed even if a part of the land is transmit-
ted to the other country and no population growth. One can imagine that all
population of a country lives in the city which always stays on the territory of
the country. For convenience we assume that q j i are sorted in ascending order
over index i and normalized, i.e.
q j i  q j+1 i for all j = 1; : : : ;Ni 1; and
Ni
å
j=1
q j i = 1 for all i= 1;2;
Agents have linear utilities with respect to the produced private good. Private
good is the only means of payment in the ceonomy. The territory of the country
stays in state property, so its citizens do not own any particular part of it. Thus,
besides territory we could similarly consider any other limited natural resource
or production factor such as rights to exploit deposits of gas, oil, etc. Citizens
can be considered as shareholders.
3.2.1 Territory exchange mechanism and timing
The agents live only one period, and they are selfish, i.e. they do not care
about future generations. So citizens of country i inherit from their parents
only common country territory Si and rights for the shares q j i of domestic
production.
During the life period of one generation the countries go through the fol-
lowing sequence of major events.
1. Countries produce private good fi(Si) using their inherited territories Si.
2. Countries transfer the amounts of land DSi which they choose in the
result of trade or conquest.
3. Countries produce private good fi(Si+DSi) using their changed territo-
ries.
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Countries produce product twice (events 1 and 3) and may exchange terri-
tory in between (event 2).1 In the beginning of the period countries have zero
amount of private good, because each generation is selfish and consumes all
good to the end of its life. So country can pay for the increase of its terri-
tory only after it produces good. Hence payments can be made after any of
these three events. Citizens do not discount their consumption during the time
period.
All land is used and its total amount is constant S1+S2 = const, hence the
sum of territory changes DSi is zero, meaning
DS1 = DS2: (3.2)
The government of each country can buy land from its neighbor by paying the
citizens of the neighboring country compensations for loses of their income
due to decreased production.
Government of each country can transfer the payment (private good) per-
sonally to citizens of the other country. We assume that the payment is made
before the product is redistributed among the citizens of the county that buys
territory. Thus, we can say that, a proportional tax is imposed on the citizens
of the buyer country, while individual compensations to citizens of the seller
country look like bribes. These are the key assumptions allowing to compen-
sate only to the selected part of the seller country society its loss of utility, that
lead to “asymmetry” between buyer and seller.
Sum of product transactions ti to the country should be zero
t1+ t2 = 0; (3.3)
unless there is no additional expense.
3.2.2 Forms of governments and decision making
The territory exchange needs approval from the citizens of both countries in
the case of trade and only from the citizens of attacking country in the case
of conquest. The approval is given according to the national decision making
system.
Due to the territory change DSi the production of country i changes at the
following amount
D fi  fi(Si+DSi)  fi(Si): (3.4)
1Two production events, instead of one, will be essential in Section 3.4, where due to pos-
sibility to cheat, countries should have some good to pay before the exchange. Notice, that
exchange of territory after the last production would make no sense for selfish population.
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Let us first consider the country that sells its territory. In order person j
of country i to agree with the deal her loss of utility q j i D fi should be com-
pensated. We consider the following formes of government implying different
voting procedures requiring minimal total compensation aiD fi:
 Monarchy implies that only one person possesses the production and
makes decisions (meaning absolute monarchy), i.e. qNi i = 1 and q j i =
0 for all j = 1; : : : ;Ni  1;. Hence, agent Ni is the Monarch. Thus, in
order to buy some land  DSi from monarchy i one needs to compensate
all loss of its domestic production D fi. The same total compensation is
required in the case of unanimous rule when each citizen has veto power
and therefore is to get compensation, thus
ai =
Ni
å
j=1
q j i = 1:
 Oligarchymeans that citizens vote with their shares. A decision is made
if people voting for it own together more than a half of domestic produc-
tion. Here the buyer needs to compensate more than half of the seller
country production losses, hence
ai = min
Jf1;:::;Nig
 
å
j2J
q j i
å
j2J
q j i >
1
2
!
:
 Democracy has the rule of majority voting. It is sufficient for the buyer
to compensate the poorest half of the seller country i society (plus one
person if Ni is an even number), with the total shares
ai =
[Ni=2]+1
å
j=1
q j i:
Thus, the buyer needs to pay for the same amount of land its full cost to a
Monarchy, more than half of its cost to an Oligarchy, and the smallest amount
to a Democracy. It follows from the following inequalities
[Ni=2]+1
å
j=1
q j i  min
Jf1;:::;Nig
 
å
j2J
q j i
å
j2J
q j i >
1
2
!
 1: (3.5)
Parameter ai 2 (0;1] is the minimal relative share of country loses, that one
needs to compensate in order to get agreement of the country to sell its ter-
ritory. This parameter reflects the decision mechanism in a country. When
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ai = 1 then we model country i as a Monarchy, when ai 2

[Ni=2]+1
Ni
;1

we
consider an Oligarchy, when ai 2

1
2 ;
[Ni=2]+1
Ni
i
it can be either an Oligarchy or
a Democracy, and when ai 2
 
0; 12

it is a Democracy. Coefficient ai can also
be a measure of inequality in country i, if it is a Democracy.
Situation when country i buys land is different. Since shares q j i of future
production remain constant all citizens with q j i > 0 get benefit q j iD fi from
the increase of country territory DSi > 0. Hence, all citizens agree to give their
future q j iD fi for the territory increase DSi regardless of the government form in
their country. Thus, each country i sells its territory for not less than aiD fi >
0 and buys territory for not more than D fi > 0, because otherwise the deal
would not be approved. It means that if ai < 1 then country i can sell territory
cheaper than buy it. This “asymmetry”, as we mentioned in Section 3.2.1,
comes from ability of buyer country to compensate only selected citizens of
seller county their losses.
Group of country citizens, that needs minimal compensation to promote
a deal, will be called the ruling coalition of the country. We can say that
government of each country maximizes the wealth of its ruling coalition. Thus,
ai is the sum of shares of ruling coalition.
3.3 Fair land trades
Let us consider fair land trading, where no conquest or cheating is allowed. So
one cannot refuse to pay for the purchased land even after the final production
(event 3 in section 3.2.1). Let us suppose that county 1 buys territory from
country 2. The consumption of the buyer consists of the production in the
first event f1(S1), the production in the third event f1(S1)+D f1, and negative
payment t1  0. The maximization problem of the buyer with respect to DS1
and t1 can be written omitting the constant 2 f1(S1)
D f1+ t1 ! max
DS12[0; DS2]; t12[ t2;0]
; (3.6)
s.t. D f1+ t1  0; (participation constraint) (3.7)
2 f1(S1)+D f1+ t1  0; (budget constraint) (3.8)
where maximization of social welfare gain D f1+ t1 is equivalent to the max-
imization of the ruling coalition welfare gain a1D f1 +a1t1, because all citi-
zens are ready to pay for the increase of their country’s territory, since all of
them benefit from it proportionally to their constant shares q j1. Participation
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constraint (3.7) implies positive social welfare gain and hence ensures budget
constraint (3.8) so we can disregard the budget constraint here.
In the seller country, the not ruling part of the society is worse off, because
it does not get any compensation for their loss in future production share, in
all (1 a2)D f2. Thus, the seller’s problem is as follows
a2D f2+ t2 ! max
DS22[ DS1;0]; t22[0; t1]
; (3.9)
s.t. a2D f2+ t2  0: (3.10)
Expressions (3.6)–(3.10) form a bargaining problem.
We assume that this problem can be solved by the governments, so that
they both are interested in maximization of their total revenue, D f1+a2D f2,
from the trade. Indeed, it is easy to show that any reasonable bargaining solu-
tion (e.g. Nash bargaining solution) defining the payment t1 =  t2 for given
territory exchange DS2 =  DS1 provides incentives for both governments to
consider such territory exchange that maximizes the total revenue D f1+a2D f2.
It follows from the positive dependance of the resulting objective functions
D f1 + t1 and a2D f2 + t2 on the total revenue D f1 +a2D f2. Hence, common
maximization problem is the following
D f1+a2D f2 ! max
DS1= DS20
; (3.11)
s.t. D f1+a2D f2  0; (3.12)
where trade possibility condition (3.12) is obtained from the sum of budget
constraints (3.7) and (3.10) taking into account relation (3.3). Problem (3.11)–
(3.12) does not contain moneyproduct transfers and defines only territory allo-
cation which is an interest of ours.
We can define the price
pi  ¶D fi¶DSi =
¶ fi(S)
¶S

S=Si+DSi
;
using expression (3.4). Thus, pi is the maximal price at which country i can
buy small part of territory. Then, aipi is the price at which country i can sell
small part of its territory. In Fig. 3.1 the prices pi are drown with solid lines
and the prices aipi with dashed lines. In these terms the first order condition
for problem (3.11) takes the following form
p1 a2p2 = 0 for DS1 > 0; (3.13)
p1 a2p2  0 for DS1 = 0: (3.14)
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S1 S21 2
A
B C
p1
a1p1
p2
a2p2
Figure 3.1: Functions p1 and p2 of territories S1 and S2 are the marginal pro-
ductivities of territory of countries 1 and 2. Functions a1p1 and a2p2 are the
marginal production shares of ruling coalitions in countries 1 and 2.
Condition (3.13) means that if the initial border between the countries is on
the left from the absciss of point C in Figs. 3.1 and 3.2 then the countries will
move the border toC. Condition (3.14) means that if the border is on the right
ofC country 1 will not buy any land.
In order to solve the same problem when country 2 buys territory from
country 1 we need only to change indexes in (3.13) and (3.14)
p2 a1p1 = 0 for DS2 > 0; (3.15)
p2 a1p1  0 for DS2 = 0: (3.16)
Condition (3.15) means that if the initial border between countries is on the
right from the absciss of point B in Figs. 3.1 and 3.2, then the countries will
move the border to B. Condition (3.16) means that if the border is on the right
of B country 2 will not buy any land.
From the solutions (3.13)–(3.16) we can conclude that if the initial border
position is on the left from point B, the only option is for country 2 to sell its
lend to country 1, so that new border is at point C, and vice versa, if the initial
border position is on the right from pointC, the only option is for country 1 to
sell its lend to country 2, so that new border is at point B. The only question left
is at which point, B orC, countries will move their border if its initial position
is between B and C. The answer, which country to be the buyer and which the
seller, depends on the particular bargaining conditions. But we can assume,
as before, that governments maximize the total revenue from the trade. Then
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S1 S21 2
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B C
p1
a1p1
p2
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D f BC1 +a2D f
BC
2
Figure 3.2: Country 1 buys territory from country 2 moving the border from
point B to point C. Total trade revenue is the gray area D f BC1 +a2D f
BC
2 .
the border near or at point B will be moved to point C, and vice versa, the
border near or at point C will be moved to point B, which creates a cycle in
generations. For example, when country 1 is the buyer, moving border from B
to C, the total revenue is D f BC1 +a2D f
BC
2 , which is the gray area in Fig. 3.2,
where we denote D f BCi = fi(SCi )  fi(SBi ) according to (3.4). In the next life
period the situation is the opposite, and new generations of citizens move the
border from C to B.
Thus, we get a cyclical solution which is a sequence of bargaining results
on the border position (of events 2, section 3.2.1), one in each generation’s life
time. Generally speaking, this solution is asymptotically stable in Lyapunov’s
sense (Liapounoff, 1907).
Definition 1 Let x(t) be the solution and x˜(t) be the perturbed solution, where
t is the time. Solution x(t) is (asymptotically) stable if for every e > 0 there ex-
ists d = d (e)> 0 such that jx˜(0)  x(0)j< d is sufficient for jx˜(t)  x(t)j< e
for all t > 0 (and lim
t!¥ x˜(t) = x(t)).
The only case when solution could be unstable is when the initial border posi-
tion is at the threshold, where countries can not decide which country should
sell or buy, because both options give equal total trade revenue.
Let us introduce average size of the the country i
hSii= S
B
i +S
C
i
2
; (3.17)
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where SBi is the size of country when the border is at point B, while S
C
i is that at
C. We can conclude from Figs. 3.1 and 3.2, that minimal territory of country i
positively depends on its parameter ai, while maximal size of the country does
not depend on ai
dSB1
da1
> 0;
dSC2
da2
> 0;
dSC1
da1
= 0;
dSB2
da2
= 0: (3.18)
Hence, the average size of country i positively depends on parameter ai, i.e.
d hSii
dai
> 0: (3.19)
It means that, caeteris paribus, Monarchy in average is bigger than Oligarchy,
which is, in tern, bigger than Democracy. The greater the inequality in the
Democracy, the smaller its territory could be.
3.3.1 Welfare analysis
Even without knowledge about exact values of product transfers ti we can say
something about the dependance between social welfare of the country and
its type of government. Since agents have linear utilities the utilitarian social
welfare function can be evaluated as production plus product transfer Wi =
fi(Si)+ ti. Let us introduce the average social welfare of country i as
hWii= fi(S
B
i )+ t
B
i + fi(S
C
i )+ t
C
i
2
; (3.20)
where SBi and t
B
i are the territory and product transfers of country i, if the border
is at point B; while SCi and t
C
i are those atC in Fig. 3.2. Thus, regardless of the
governments’ bargaining powers, we can write the lower bounds of countries’
welfares
hW1i  f1(SB1 ); hW2i  f2(SC2 ): (3.21)
The global average social welfare can be calculated precisely from (3.20),
due to the payment balance (3.3):
hW1+W2i=
2
å
i=1
fi(SBi )+ fi(S
C
i )
2
: (3.22)
If we differentiate expression (3.22) with respect to parameters ai, then using
conditions (3.1) and (3.18), we get that the global average social welfare (3.22)
positively depends on both parameters a1 and a2, i.e.
d hW1+W2i
dai
> 0 for all i= 1;2: (3.23)
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S1 S21 2
A
p1 p2
Figure 3.3: Functions p1 and p2 of territories S1 and S2 are the marginal pro-
ductivities of territory of countries 1 and 2.
Thus, we can get the unique global social optimum for the corner solution
a1 = a2 = 1, which implies that each country is Monarchy or has unanimous
voting rule. So the counties locate the border at point A.
3.3.2 Two Monarchies choose the stable social optimum
When two Monarchies trade territory the buyer have to compensate all domes-
tic production loss to the seller since a1 = a2 = 1. That is why maximization
problems (3.6)–(3.7) and (3.9)–(3.10) coincide:
D f1+D f2 ! max
DS1= DS2
; (3.24)
s.t. D f1+D f2  0; (3.25)
and have the same unique solution p1 = p2, positioning the border at point A
in Fig. 3.3.
This territory allocation is a global social optimum as it actually maximizes
the sum of production in both countries
DSA1 = arg maxDS1= DS2
f1(S1+DS1)+ f2(S2+DS2) = arg max
DS1= DS2
D f1+D f2:
That is why this allocation is Pareto efficient. We note that the territory al-
location of two Monarchies is a steady state equilibrium which means that if
time period starts with such allocation the Monarchies will not change it. This
steady state solution is also asymptotically stable in Lyapunov’s sense; see
definition 1, which means that if period starts with slightly different allocation
then it converges to that with border at point A.
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3.4 Effect of possibility to cheat and conquest
Let us add to the model the possibilities of not committing the obligation on a
contract (cheating) by the seller and conquest of the territory by the buyer. The
conquest is a two step sequential game, see Fig. 3.4. In the first step country
1 (conqueror) instead of paying for the territory, pays  ta1  0 for hiring the
army to conquer a part of neighbor’s territory. In the second step, if the country
under attack does not pay equal or greater amount of product  ta2 to the army
to defend its territory, then the territory goes to the conqueror.
We recall that private good is produced twice in the time period: in the
beginning and in the end (see section 3.2.1). We assume that between these
two productions (event 2 in section 3.2.1) countries play the game in Fig. 3.5,
which includes two conquest subgames, see Fig. 3.4. Thus, before the game
each country is endowed with the good from the first production. Only that
amount of good can be used for land purchasing, because no one would rely
on the promise to pay in the end of the period if cheating is allowed. Hence,
there is the initial product constraint
fi(Si)+ tAi  0; (3.26)
which matters only for the conqueror as will be shown later on.
Conquest looks like country 1 buys land from Monarchy (see Fig. 3.1),
having budget constraint (3.26). The only difference is that the seller does not
get the payment
 ta1 =min
 D f A2 ; f1(S1)	 ; (3.27)
which goes to the Army. The Army could be treated as the third player, which
can not gain utility from the land itself but only conquers territory for the coun-
try which pays the highest price.
In the conquest game in Fig. 3.4, country 2 will wish to defend its territory
DS2 with minimal military expanses ta2 = ta1 if conqueror pays ta1 < D f2,
otherwise country 2 retreats with ta2 = 0.
Proposition 1 Initial production fi(Si) of country i is greater than loss D fi>
0 from any territory decrease DSi 2 [ Si;0), i.e. fi(Si)> D fi.
Proof I t follows from definition (3.4) of symbol D fi and the first property of
function fi(Si) in (3.1). 
Corollary 1 In order to conquer the territory DS1 country 1 should transfer
ta1 = D f2
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1 2
defend
retreat
ta1 ; t
a
2
D f1+ta1 ; D f2
ta1
Figure 3.4: Conquest game. Payoffs of countries are sums of payoffs of all its
citizens. Conqueror chooses military transfer ta1 < 0. Attacked country defends
spending ta2 = t
a
1 < 0 if t1 > D f2, or retreats spending t
a
2 = 0 if t
a
1  D f2. That
is why in SPNE conqueror chooses ta1 = D f2.
Proof I t follows from proposition 1, that country 2 has enough initial endow-
ment f2(S2) to defend its territory, which it wishes to do only if  ta1 <  D f2.
Hence, inequality (3.26) is strict and  tA1 = D f2 is the minimal payment for
conquest. 
Using corollary 2, we can write the maximization problem of the conqueror
in the game Fig. 3.4
D f1+D f2 ! max
DS1= DS20
; (3.28)
s.t. f1(S1)+D f2  0; (3.29)
which differs from (3.24)–(3.25) only by constraint (3.29). Constraint (3.29)
can be active. To specify the Subgame Perfect Nesh Equilibrium (SPNE) of
the conquest game in Fig. 3.4 in cases of active and inactive constraint (3.29)
we introduce the following definition.
Definition 2 Wewill say that country 1 is rich if its initial production is greater
than total loss of production in country 2 after moving the border to point A,
i.e. the following inequality is satisfied
f1(S1)> D f A2 : (3.30)
Thus, country 1 is not rich if inequality (3.30) is not satisfied.
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Figure 3.5: The game territory exchange is played each time period by new
generation. Payoffs of country 1 are sums of payoffs of all its citizens. Payoffs
of country 2 are sums of payoffs of its ruling coalition members.
The SPNE of the game in Fig. 3.4 consists of the payments to the army
(3.27), ta2 = 0, and territory changes DSi which can be found in both cases of
rich and not rich country 1.
1. If country 1 is rich (see definition (2)), then it conquers DSA1 . Con-
queror’s profit is D f A1 +D f A2  0 while the profit of country 2 is D f A2  0
and profit of its ruling coalition is a2D f A2  0.
2. If country 1 is not rich, then inequality (3.30) is not satisfied, which
implies that country 1 conquers such amount of territory DSa1  DSA1 that
f1(S1) = D f2.
We will analyze the game in Fig. 3.5 for both internal solution for rich con-
queror and corner solution for not rich one.
If the government of country 1 wants to buy land DS1, then it proposes to
its citizens a project of purchase, for which amount of product  t1 is collected
from the citizens who will benefit from the territory increase. It means that
everybody, who have strictly positive share q j1 of production, would agree to
pay not more than q j1D f1 and, hence, would vote for the project. Then the
government of country 1 gives product t2 =  t1  minf  f1(S1);D f1g to the
ruling coalition of country 2.
The ruling coalition of country 2 receives the amount of product t2 and
can execute its duty, giving required territory  DS2 to the buyer, or it can
cheat, refusing to give the territory. In the first case the profit of the seller’s
ruling coalition is t2+a2D f2, profit of the buyer is t1+D f1, where transfers are
balanced according to (3.3), and the game is finished. In the case of cheating,
the profit of seller is t2, while the profit of buyer is t1 < 0. But the buyer has the
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possibility to conquer part DSa1 of the disputed territory, paying for this D f
a
2 as
much as the seller maximally can pay to keep that territory. In that case, being
rational, the seller country retreats without fight, and its ruling coalition have
profit t2+a2D f a2 while the profit of the buyer is t1+D f a1 +D f a2 , and the game
is finished.
Proposition 2 Country 1 buys only such amount of land DS1, which it would
be able to conquer in the case of cheating by county 2.
Country 1 buys land when it surely is not going to be cheated, because other-
wise it would conquer it in the first place. If county 1 buys more than it could
conquer after has been cheated, then it gives country 2 incentives to cheat, be-
cause country 2 would have more land rest after conquest than after executing
its duties. 
Corollary 2 Country 1 buys land of amount DS1, not exceeding the amount
DSA1 , that locate the border at point A, like it would trade with Monarchy.
Since point A is the optimal position of the border for unconstrained conquest
(3.28) country 1 would never conquer more than DSA1 after being cheated. It
follows from proposition 2 that country 1 also do not buy more then DSA1 . 
It follows from corollary 2, that maximization problem for buying the lend
D f1+ t1 ! max
DS10; t10
; (3.31)
s.t. f1(S1)+D f2+ t1  0; (3.32)
has more restrictive budget constraint (3.32) than (3.7). If both countries prefer
to trade the bargaining problem is composed by (3.31)–(3.32) and (3.9)–(3.10)
with conquest (3.28)–(3.29) as a disagreement point.
1. When country 1 is not rich (see definition (2)) then inequality (3.32)
becomes an equality. Hence, DSa1 is also a solution of maximization
problem (3.31)–(3.32), which yields profit D f a1 +D f
a
2 + t1, where t1 
0. Country 1 chooses between conquest and purchase, comparing their
profits D f a1 +D f
a
2 and D f
a
1 +D f
a
2 + t1, therefore, it would buy only for
free, i.e. t1 = 0, which is the disagreement point for seller country 2.
Thus, not rich country conquers territory rather then buys it.
2. When country 1 is rich (inequality (3.30) is satisfied) it buys DSA1 ac-
cording to corollary 2, with payment t2 = t1  f1(S1)+D f A2 .
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These strategies are SPNE of the game in Fig. 3.5 which can be described in
terms introduced in (H. I. Grossman & Mendoza, 2001a, 2001b). We distin-
guish the type of annexation according to the values of t2.
 We can say that if t2+a2D f A2  0, then it is an Uncoerced Annexation,
because the ruling coalition of country 2 is better off in the end of the
period.
 If t2+a2D f A2 < 0 while t2 > 0, then it is a Coerced Annexation, because
the ruling coalition of country 2 is worse off after the trade. Which
means that country 1 has threatened country 2 with possibility of con-
quest. Though, we have not any additional costs introduced for Coerced
Annexation, like the cost of deploying Legions in (H. I. Grossman &
Mendoza, 2001a, 2001b).
 If the countries have nothing to bargain about, because country 1 is not
rich, then it simply conquers the territory DSa1, which we could call an
Attempted Conquest, where t2 = 0.
Thus, not rich yet more efficient country conquers territory generation by gen-
eration until it becomes rich enough to buy territory of the globally optimal
size SAi .
The main result of this section is that the possibility to cheat and con-
quest completely removes the dependence of the country size on its type of
government. More then that, this possibility results in the Pareto efficient and
asymptotically stable steady state territory allocation like that between two
Monarchies with border at point A in Fig. 3.1.
Another interesting result is that “not rich” countries expand by concurring
territory. While “rich” countries buy territory, because other countries would
not dare to concur it. That could be the reason why Alaska was sold to the
United States rather than absorbed in North-West Territories of future Canada.
Although Russian-American Company, that was a monopoly in Alaska, was
evaluated 3,721,400 silver rubles, see (Okun, 1939), while Alaska was sold
for approximately 11 million silver rubles. Thus, clearly we have a case of
Uncoerced Annexation.
3.5 Effect of additional costs
Until now we believed that the there is no costs for adaptation of new territory
or moving the border. Let us assume that there are adaptation cost d  0 per
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S1 S21 2
A
A1 A1
B B˜
C
C˜
p1
a1p1
p2
a2p2
Figure 3.6: Country 1 buys territory from country 2 moving the border from
point B to point C. Total trade revenue D f B˜C˜1 +a2D f
B˜C˜
2   c  d
DSB˜C˜1  is the
gray area minus constant c.
unit of traded territory and constant cost c  0 of rebuilding the border, then
product balance equation (3.3) takes the following form:
t1+ t2 = c d jDS1j : (3.33)
Hence, maximization problem (3.11)–(3.12) also changes:
D f1+a2D f2  c d jDS1j ! max
DS1= DS20
; (3.34)
s.t. D f1+a2D f2  c d jDS1j  0; (3.35)
The first order condition for problem (3.34) takes the following form:
p1 a2p2 d = 0 for DS1 > 0; (3.36)
p1 a2p2  0 for DS1 = 0: (3.37)
We see that only per unit adaptation cost d influences the first order condition
(3.36)–(3.37), and hence, moves points B and C to B˜ and C˜, see Fig. (3.6),
while constant c in the maximization constraint (3.12) determines whether
trade will happen or not. Thus, oscillatory solutions can occur only if both
of the following inequalities are satisfied
D f B˜C˜1 +a2D f
B˜C˜
2   c d

SC˜1  SB˜1

 0; (3.38)
D f C˜B˜2 +a1D f
C˜B˜
1   c d

SB˜2  SC˜2

 0: (3.39)
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It is easily seen form Def. 1, that if inequalities (3.38) and (3.39) are strict for
all points of a solution, then the oscillatory solution is asymptotically stable.
Oscillatory solutions could coexist with multiple steady state solutions, these
are all such points Si for which the following inequalities are satisfied:
D f C˜1 +a2D f
C˜
2   c d

SC˜1  S1

< 0; (3.40)
D f B˜2 +a1D f B˜1   c d

SB˜2  S2

< 0: (3.41)
These steady state solutions are stable but not asymptotically. Here it means
that if we change the initial point a little (so that inequalities (3.40) and (3.41)
are still satisfied), then the perturbed solution neither goes further away from
the unperturbed solution, nor converges back to it.
If cheating and conquest are allowed, then the same game theoretic reason-
ing, as in the previous section, gives us the existence of a steady state points
Si, which should satisfy the following inequality:
D f A˜1 +D f
A˜
2   c d
SA˜i  Si < 0: (3.42)
It means that all points between A1 and A2 are stable steady state solutions.
We can conclude that additional linear costs reduce the amplitude of terri-
tory oscillations. Hence, they decrease dependence between size of the country
and its type of government. Such costs can also cause the appearance of mul-
tiple stable steady state positions of the border.
3.6 Conclusion
In this work the mechanism governing the territory exchanging between groups
of people such as countries is proposed, based on trading with approval of both
sides under particular voting rule (veto rule, majority rule,...).
We have obtained a cyclical in time asymptotically stable solution, which
is the sequence of bargaining results on the border position, one in each gen-
eration life time. We also have found that the average size and social welfare
of the Monarchy are bigger than those of Oligarchy, which in turn bigger than
those of Democracy. The greater inequality in a Democracy, the smaller its
territory could be.
Possibility to cheat and conquest completely removes the dependence of
the country size on its type of government. More than that, this possibility
results in the Pareto efficient and asymptotically stable steady state territory
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allocation, like one between two Monarchies or countries with veto voting
rules (when decisions can be made only unanimously).
It was found that only rich countries, that produce more product than sell-
ers could lose, Definition 2, can afford to buy territory rather then conquer it.
Monarchy sells its territory only when it is to difficult to protect, for instance,
because of the high distances, like in the case of Alaska, that would have been
difficult to defend form British Empire. We may say, that it was the US, that
was rich enough to be capable of defending its new territory.
Additional linear costs reduce the amplitude of territory oscillations. Hence,
they decrease the dependence of the size of a country on its form of govern-
ment. Such costs can also cause the appearance of multiple stable steady state
positions of the border.
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